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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

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THE CULTURAL AND PREACHING VALUES OF PHILOSOPHY [1]

G. A. CLARKE

Emmanuel Baptist Church, Brooklyn

In a recent address, a well-known bishop stated that philosophy today is bankrupt, and that while philosophy and religion were formerly a pair of companions, now it is science and religion that go in company. This paper sees permanent values in philosophy and attempts to state them.

It was during the war. We were having a quiet evening under some trees beside our hut in a training-camp in England. I was reading Dr. William Newton Clarke's *Outline of Christian Theology*. A young captain stepped alongside and said, "What are you reading?" I replied, "I am reading a book about God and you." "Oh, religion!" he replied; "there is not much of a market for that now, is there? It is rather passé, isn't it?" I remarked, "The page I happen to be reading is stating why you behave decently instead of otherwise. Listen to this," and I read: "We 'ought' because the original and perfect Being is the standard of character and action, and has inwrought duty to our constitution. The nature and character of God, with our relation to him, is the ground of obligation." I remarked, "That has to do with the question as to why the captain behaves as he does. What do you think of it?" His reply surprised me; he said, "Let me have that book when you can spare it." What interested him was that here was a philosophy of life that gave life a ground, a mean-

[1] A paper read before the Baptist Ministers' Conference of New York City.

ing, a style, a direction and a purpose; and that captain of engineers was deeply interested, notwithstanding the cavalier fashion in which he first tried to bluff me into thinking that he was indifferent. Our conversation went on. He saw the word "theology" on the cover of the book. "So that is theology," he said. "Tell me," he continued, "what is philosophy?" The captain was a college man, and well I knew it. While I had read philosophy during the years immediately preceding the army life, I had never tried to create a definition. For him I attempted it, and said, "Philosophy is the attempt to give an interpretation of human life and the universe in the light of the knowledge gained by all the sciences."

Is philosophy, as Plato called it, simply "that dear delight," or is it something necessary to the preacher? In New Haven at a meeting of the American Philosophical Society, some months ago, Professor Morris Cohen of New York University said, "Philosophy, that sweet delight, is not for the man in the street." That statement is two-edged; first, that philosophy is something that is utterly useless to the mason and carpenter and that, while it is useful to the man in the study, yet that use has certain definite limitations, which are to be included under "life's delights." Surely it is more. As a matter of fact, the man in the street has a philosophy. It may sometimes be terrible in its crudeness, but sometimes it is surprisingly sublime. Socrates regarded philosophy as a matter for conversation with the man in the street. We are expected to climb to a watch-tower, where we shall see what is really happening on Broadway, and when we have thought through to the meaning of it all, we are to emerge from our quiet places, having reduced mental struggles to clear, crisp statements that give to the man in Broadway an interpretation of his life, a sense of dignity and direction. Philosophy is not only a delight, it becomes an interpreter. It is both necessary and dangerous that we speak to people. The awful responsibility of knowing that we are giving set and direction to human lives, who take

single statements as reliable instruction in duty and direction, bears down on an honest man's soul with a weight of seriousness that he ought never to be without.

We are philosophers whether we keep up the reading of philosophy or not. We are philosophers because we think. Someone has said that philosophy is a thinking view of the whole. Of what use is your philosophy? William Shakespeare pictures a hot encounter between Cassius and Brutus in the tent of Brutus, as the army was in camp near Sardis. Cassius is hotly resentful of some sharp criticism of the honest Brutus. Brutus in turn admitted that he was a bit heated in mind, and remarked:

"Oh, Cassius, I am sick of many griefs."

Cassius was quick to return with a thrust at the stoic Brutus by saying:

"Of your philosophy you make no use,
If you give way to accidental evils."

Of what use is philosophy? I state what I see as the Cultural and Preaching Values of Philosophy.

The Cultural Values

Philosophy develops an appreciation of the intellectual and spiritual efforts of man. I do not mean that you agree with every man you appreciate, for that is utterly impossible. One of our worst weaknesses in purchasing books is that we are apt to select book after book along the line of our developed interest and books that are apt to confirm us in what we want to have confirmed. If one does ever so little traveling in the field of philosophy, it will be to see trends of thought that challenge his own conclusions; and yet one sees the process by which an honest man takes opposing ground. The result is an examination of one's own thinking, which does not necessarily mean abandoning it. Indeed, it may mean the placing of a still higher value on what we already have; but it will also mean

that we have learned to appreciate the intellectual and spiritual efforts of those who differ from us, to appreciate honestly the sterling worth of those whose conclusions challenge ours. That is among the finest of moral attainments.

Philosophy develops patience with intellectual plodders who seem to be vague in their statements. We have stated a thing, and are told that we have made it clear. At once the question comes to us, has the statement been clear, because we drew a circle around the area to be explored and within that circle simply arranged a selected number of facts? Of course, within that area everything has been arranged and stated with clarity and finality. But suppose someone cuts away a bit of the circle and new facts are brought into view—that means a struggle to state the truth in the light of the new area of knowledge. Is it possible for the intellectual explorer always to be clear? I even ask, can the pioneer possibly be clear? He has only partial views of emerging truth. He is convinced from what he has seen that it is real; he attempts to state it; we read his statement, and say, " that is muddy." How can the front-line intellectual explorer state with clearness what he is but partially seeing? It is something like the familiar story of Plato's Cave. The prisoners are released, and those whose eyes have been accustomed to shadows are caused to look right out toward the blazing light. The glare distresses them, and they suffer sharp pain; in fact, with eyes accustomed to look at shadows, they can barely see the realities at all; they are half blind, and the view is hazy. So it must be with the front-rank men in science and philosophy; they have turned their eyes toward realities and light that half blind them, they are suffering pain, and when they try to tell us what they are struggling to see, we, ungenerous prisoners of the cave, say, " their statement is muddy." Yet if we think awhile, if philosophy is doing its work, we withhold judgment, and we appreciate those intellectual plodders who are exploring new areas of truth. Philosophy develops patience. Patience often in the

past was absent in the treatment of heretics who are hailed as saints in the present. What a debt we owe to the heretics—the heretics whose heresy was that their eyes were turned toward reality and fuller light. Patience is not so much "broadmindedness" as it is "longmindedness," and it is ready to give a man time to demonstrate the merits of his discoveries.

Philosophy develops confidence. Are times hard and is the situation disappointing? There have been such times before. With Plato you share the place where you are a spectator of all time and all existence, and you see history in a bird's-eye view. "No," says the philosopher, "we are not at the edge of the precipice about to leap over into tragic death; we are simply at the turn in the winding path that ascends the mountain. We are tired, we are thirsty, out of breath, but we are explorers, pioneers; we are going on, for a little higher is the plateau, and beyond the mountain is a new land." And confidence beats down despair. The philosopher refuses to believe that wisdom and progress will die with this age. The world is experiencing the birth pangs of the age of fuller social justice. These, as I see them, are the Cultural Values of Philosophy.

The Preaching Values of Philosophy

Philosophy saves us from the attempt to "whip dead horses down blind alleys." Let us admit right away that the history of philosophy has preserved blind-alley philosophies. The question is asked, "Why cumber either the libraries or the student with blind-alley philosophies?" I see two replies. One is that the very struggles of honest souls, who worked at them, make them worthy of a place in the record. The other answer is that being in the record we can quickly see them, and in the knowledge of them save ourselves the time of exploring in those particular directions.

Of such were Stoicism and Epicureanism. Stoicism, which the merchant Zeno planted in Athens about 310 B. C., was

designed to give satisfaction to a man through stolid endurance of the inevitable. It reappeared in the pessimistic will to endure of Schopenhauer. It is useless for the individual to fight against the universal, and the Stoic's way out is simply to steel himself against everything and develop indifference to being buffeted by circumstances that cannot be altered. Victory can never be realized; therefore the wisest thing is to forget it, and with understanding resignation to accept the inevitable and refuse to be disturbed in mind. If the assumption of a predetermined condition in life be correct, the ideal of calm acceptance of it is certainly attainable but by a very few. The common people could never hear such advice gladly.

Epicurus gives little better advice. He saw no hope of changing conditions, but would select certain pleasures to help the victim forget his degradation. Since the joys of the intellect are the joys that Epicurus recommends, there is a great difference between Epicurus and Epicureanism, as our world understands it; for modern Epicureanism will run to all sorts of sensuous things as a means of making life enjoyable, or as popularly meant, to make up life itself. " This is the life " is the slogan of the modern sensuous Epicurean. Such systems of thought are interesting, therefore we preserve them in a history of philosophy. They help us to save time in " whipping dead horses down blind alleys." Since preaching is such a serious affair, and we have so little time with people, we are well served by the philosophy which prevents us wasting time in giving unsound counsel.

The book of Ecclesiastes is important in the Old Testament Scriptures largely because of its negative value. What could be more depressing than the reiterated conclusion of the philosopher who says, " Vanity of vanities, all is vanity." That attempt at a philosophy of life is a product of two hundred years before Christ. The hero of the book is in search of satisfaction; he has indicated the blind trails he followed in a vain attempt. He sought for satisfaction in knowledge. " I,

as a preacher, was king in Jerusalem. I gave myself to seek out and search by wisdom concerning all things that are done under heaven." Apparently he believed in the power of knowledge, and that by that power he could claim what he wanted. Like Alfred Tennyson's "Ulysses," he found that

> "All experience is an arch wherethrough
> Gleams that untraveled world whose margin fades
> Forever and forever when I move,"

and he gave up embittered and in despair—"All is vanity." He tried pleasure. Said he, "Go to now, I will prove thee with mirth, therefore, I sought in mine heart to give myself unto wine." Having abandoned knowledge for pleasure, he emptied that cup and was unhappy still. Again—"All is vanity." Then he tried great works. Said he, "I built me houses and planted me vineyards, I got me servants, I had great possessions." But life was transitory; there was injustice and disappointment; and again—"All is vanity." He tried riches. He would gain the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow; said he, "money answereth all things." He set out for a fortune and got it, as did Robert Service's pioneer in *The Lure of the Yukon;* but his soul had not found reality. Again—"All is vanity." But the preacher-philosopher of Ecclesiastes is of the greatest modern value because in a wonderful literary product he prevents us wasting time attempting to drive "dead horses down blind alleys." In so many modern quests men are disappointed. It is worth while to preserve in the records Blind-alley Philosophies, because they save our time. The author of Ecclesiastes gets us out on the highway that leads somewhere when he says, "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man."

Then, having learned to distinguish between things that differ, and to identify things that are the same, *philosophy enables one to make a clear and comprehensive use of the things that are worth while saying.* We have sifted for truth. To

identify truth, we have used historical tests, moral tests, scientific tests, pragmatic tests and religious tests. Now we are going to use what we are satisfied is true.

Somebody tells of the old Scotch lady who greatly disliked her minister. On the Sabbath morning it was raining hard. She and her minister met at the church porch; they were the only ones to appear at the church. Said he, "It is a very wet morning, Mrs. McGregor." She replied, "Get you up into yon pulpit, you will be dry enough there." Things are often uninteresting to people because we do not present them with any attractiveness of form or arrangement; and perhaps we confuse things. We must learn to distinguish between things that differ. Just lately I was present at a certain church conclave. The speaker before me used the gates of the Jerusalem wall being rebuilt by Nehemiah as the basis of his address. Such a confusion of architecture and ethics I have never heard! The sheep gate was the Gospel of the Good Shepherd, and we were the sheep; but, strange to say, going into the slaughter. The dung gate told of the refuse that must be thrown out of human lives. And so it went on; and the way those gates were whipped into line as preachers of ethics and religion was a marvel of mental gymnastics for which I have heard no equal. I think there is a difference between a gate where sheep could enter and the Gospel of the Good Shepherd. If one is used to illustrate the other, if the illustration holds, all well and good, but to say that one includes in itself and publishes the fact of the other is so close to intellectual confusion that listeners will merely scoff. No wonder that John Clifford said that the greatest marvel of the Bible is the fact that it has survived the foolish claims made for it by its friends and the wild statements uttered in its name. Our philosophy ought to teach us to distinguish between things that differ and identify things that are identical. One of the most unjust confusions of things that differ that I have met was when Dr. Charles H. Sears, of the City Missions Society of New York, spoke before the

Long Island Association of the Japanese Christian having developed a fortitude by which he refuses to be beaten by circumstances. The newspaper report said, "Doctor Sears praises Oriental fatalism." It was not fatalism he was talking about at all, it was Christian fortitude that knows how to keep its poise and possess its soul in patience under adverse circumstances, and having won that personal victory would, as a next step, tackle the task of changing the social environment. Philosophy ought to help us state clearly the things worth while, seeking to distinguish between things that differ, and to identify things that are identical; and, incidentally, never to attribute to a careful student presenting a picture a statement which is in direct opposition to what he has actually said.

Philosophy is valuable to the preacher because, as an honest student, it will give to him the knowledge that he is moving on with the well-attested results of humanity's intellectual, moral and religious efforts.

What are the things that stand as the result of those efforts? There is the fact of God. In the field of science the attitude is friendly. If science is not actually giving to us a spiritually energized universe, at least science is very friendly to the idea. I do not mean to say that religion has its message by the consent of science, for religion has its message in its own right—its own divine right. But since science and philosophy alike are so friendly to the spiritual interpretation of the life of man and his environment, it is a great day for religion, and religion can move ahead knowing that no "Smart Aleck" is going to appear around a corner with a javelin with which to puncture this central fact of God. Everything rests on this fact of God. The fact of Christ, the spiritual nature of man—responsible for what he makes of himself and the world—the sovereign power of ethical and spiritual idealism, with these we can proceed in the knowledge that we are moving forward with the well-attested results of humanity's intellectual and moral and religious efforts. That confidence is invaluable.

THE BOGOMILS, PRECURSORS OF THE ALBIGENSES

MATTHEW SPINKA

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CHRISTIANITY had originally been looked upon as a predominantly ascetic, world-renouncing religion. When it emerged from its first humble stage and attained social respectability, and finally became the dominant state religion, many of its professors found it necessary to adopt manifold compromises to reconcile theory with prevalent practise. Moreover, when the possession of power, wealth, and influence gave rise to abuses and corruption, both among the clergy and the lay membership, the purer souls revolted at the conditions and either assumed the monastic habit or became leaders of reform movements. Thus reforms were as perennial as the occasions for them. The ordinary Christian has ever been very much the individual whom Samuel Butler described as equally horrified at the denial of Christianity as at its practise.

Among the Slavic nations, Bulgaria enjoys the preeminence of being not only the oldest Christian nation, but also of producing the earliest reformist movement. The Macedonian Slavs living about Salonica were the first to reduce their language to the written form—the Glagolitic—or had it done for them by Constantine. Thus the beginnings of Slavic literature go back to the work of " the apostles of the Slavs," Cyril (whose true name was Constantine) and Methodius, who produced considerable ecclesiastical literature in the course of their missionary work in Moravia. When after the death of Methodius (885) his disciples were driven out of the country by his German-Latin opponents, they found refuge in the country of the first Christian tsar of Bulgaria, Boris. The " holy seven," as this group has been known ever since, are the true pioneers in the realm of the " church-Slavonic " literature, much of which

they brought with them from Moravia. During the glorious reign of Tsar Simeon (893-927) Bulgarian literature reached a very high degree of development. Simeon had been educated at the famous Magnaura palace school in Constantinople, where he became saturated with that type of culture commonly referred to as Byzantinism. This he transplanted bodily into his own realm when he became tsar. Like a Bulgarian Charlemagne, he gathered at his court scholars and scribes, and he himself took part in the task of translating all manner of Greek literature; a task which was prosecuted with feverish energy, if not always with discrimination. The rapid Byzantinization of the entire range of the Bulgarian national life, political, ecclesiastical and cultural, although undoubtedly beneficial, was not wholly wholesome. It completed the process begun in Boris' time, of molding the conception of the prerogatives of the tsar in accordance with the Byzantine imperial ideal, and making him far less dependent upon his nobles than he had been formerly. The nobility also changed its character from that of warlike aristocracy to feudal landlordism. The conditions in the church soon closely resembled those of the patriarchate of Constantinople: luxury and splendor characterizing the higher clergy, while the lower priesthood lived in ignorance and squalor, and the common people were left to their own misery.

The downward trend was greatly accelerated during the reign of the incompetent and weak Tsar Peter (927-969), whose pro-Byzantine policy incensed the patriotic masses against him. The picture which that zealous partisan of the church, Presbyter Cosmas, paints of the conditions prevailing in the church during the reign of Peter is in every respect a gloomy one.

No wonder, therefore, that a reaction was soon forthcoming. It assumed the form of Bogomilism, a reformist movement striving for national, political, social and religious reform. It was a Bulgarian national movement directed against Ortho-

dox Christianity, which was regarded as a Greek product allied with the prevailing political and social system inimical to the true interests of the people. We shall easily understand why the various ruling powers exerted all their energies to suppress a movement which, like the modern Russian communism, sought to overthrow the accepted order. Despite that, however, Bogomilism spread from Bulgaria into the Byzantine Empire, all over the Balkans, where especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina it became very powerful, into Roumania and Russia, into northern Italy and southern France. Some traces of it were to be found even in England. Its adherents came to be known under a variety of names: in the Byzantine Empire as Phundatoi, in Macedonia as Babuni, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and north Italy as Patarenes, in south France as Albigenses, and elsewhere as Cathari. They called themselves Christians.

Unfortunately, our sources of information are limited to such as come from the enemies of the Bogomil movement. It is therefore imperative to exercise every caution in using them in presentation of the movement. They comprise Slavic, Greek, and Latin writings, the most important of which are: Presbyter Cosmas,[1] the *Synodik of Tsar Boril* (1211)[2]; the Greek writings of Euthemius Zigabenus,[3] and of Anna Comnena.[4] The Latin sources refer mostly to the Patarenes of Bosnia. For the beginnings of the movement the best information is to be derived from Presbyter Cosmas' *Sermon About the Heretics,*[1] for he was a contemporary and dealt with a native movement. The Greek sources in their treatment of the beginnings reflect a later milieu. As for the secondary treatments, the Bulgarian works like Zlatarsky's,[5] Tsukhlev's,[6] Ivanov's,[7] and

[1] Popruzhenko, M. G.: *Sv. Kozmy presvitera Slovo na eretiki.* St. Petersburg, 1907 (Russian and Church-Slavonic).

[2] Popruzhenko, M. G.: *Sinodik tsarya Borila, Sophia,* 1928 (Russian and Church-Slavonic).

[3] Zigabenus, E.: *Panoplia dogmatica,* in Migne, P.: *Patrologia Græca.* Vol. 130. *Contra Phundagiatas seu Bogomilos,* in *Patrologia Græca.* Vol. 131.

[4] Anna Comnena, *The Alexiad.* London, 1928.

[5] Zlatarsky, V. N., *Istoriya na Blgarskata drzhava.* Vol. 1. Part 2. Sofia, 1927 (Bulgarian).

[6] Tsukhlev, D., *Istoriya na Blgarskata tsrkva.* Vol. I. Sofia, 1910 (Bulgarian).

[7] Ivanov, Ior., *Bogomilski knigi i legendi.* Sofia, 1925 (Bulgarian).

Blagoev's;[8] for the Bosnian Patarenes the classic work still is the Croatian *Bogomili i Patareni*[9] by Rački and Professor Klaić's *History of Bosnia.*[10]

The earliest notice of the movement is found in a letter written by the profligate and utterly worldly Constantinopolitan patriarch, Theophylact (933-956) to Tsar Peter. The patriarch was the fourth son of Emperor Romanus Lecapenus, and hence an uncle of Peter's wife, Maria-Irene. The letter was found recently in the Ambrosian Library in Milan.[11] It appears that Peter had been greatly exercised over the appearance of the movement, and had written twice to the patriarch for instructions as to how to deal with it. Theophylact, who was a great deal better acquainted with the breed of horses and the merits of different wines than with matters of theology, did not spend much time investigating the new teaching. The sportsman-patriarch, possibly jumping at hasty conclusions, assured the pious tsar that he knew the teaching of the group well, and pronounced it " an ancient and newly-appeared Manichæism mixed with Paulicianism." [12] The patriarch seems to have been good at guessing. Some two centuries previously, Emperor Constantine V Copronymus, one of the most energetic of the Iconoclastic emperors, after having defeated the Bulgarians in Thrace, took the opportunity to weaken the strength of the iconodule party by transplanting to the depopulated regions strong colonies of Syrian and Armenian Paulicians, who in their pronounced dualism were closely related to the Manichees. Besides the Paulicians, some Monophysites were likewise transplanted.[13] The emperor wished to oppose these strongly iconoclastic dualists, the Paulicians, to the Orthodox iconodules, but they also were to serve as guardians

[8] Blagoev, N. P., *Besedata na presviter Kosma na Bogomilite.* Sofia, 1923 (Bulgarian).

[9] Rački, F., *Bogomili i Patareni,* in *Rad Jugoslovenske Akademije,* v. 7 and 9. Zagreb, 1869-1870.

[10] Klaić, Vj., *Povjest Bosne,* Zagreb, 1882.

[11] It is reprinted, in a Bulgarian translation, in Zlatarsky, *op. cit.,* I², Appendix 11, pp. 840-845.

[12] Zlatarsky, *op. cit.,* p. 841.

[13] Theophanes, ed. C. de Boor, p. 422; Zlatarsky, *op. cit.,* I², 21, 61.

of the border against the wild hordes of the Bulgars. From Thrace the zeal of the Paulicians carried their teaching westward into Macedonia, where, as George Hamartolos testifies, they founded congregations as early as the first half of the ninth century.[14] The patriarch's explanation of the new movement therefore possesses a good deal of verisimilitude. Although he nowhere mentioned the leaders of the new movement, and above all did not refer to it as Bogomilism—a name the movement received later—Theophylact was not at a loss how to classify the phenomenon. To him it was the well-known ancient heresy of Manichæism and Paulicianism emerging anew in Bulgaria. Theophylact gave Peter specific instructions how to deal with the priests who had fallen into these errors. It is thus evident that a considerable number of Orthodox priests had become identified with the movement, although at the time the patriarch was writing the letter no one among them seems to have become the recognized leader of it. From Theophylact's insistence that it was a "newly-appeared heresy" it would seem that neither he nor Peter were concerned with the ancient Bulgarian Paulician groups as such, but that the movement which caused Peter so much uneasiness was distinct from, although closely allied with them.

While we have no historical data regarding the practical steps taken by Tsar Peter to suppress the movement, it seems logical to suppose that he followed the advice of the patriarch, which he had so earnestly sought, and persecuted the adherents of the "heresy." If that supposition be correct, it must have been during this period of persecution that one person gained such preeminence as leader or reorganizer of the movement that it was ever after known by his name. That man was the Orthodox Bulgarian priest Bogomil.

Our sources of information about this remarkable man, unfortunately, are extremely scanty. That doughty opponent of the Bogomil movement, Presbyter Cosmas, contributes prac-

[14] Georgios Hamartolos, ed. Miralti, p. 607.

tically all that is known concerning him, and that is almost nil. He tells us that " in the time of the Orthodox Tsar Peter there lived in the Bulgarian land a priest, Bogomil by name, who in reality was *Bogu ne mil,*[15] who first began to teach heresy in the Bulgarian land." [16] According to the editor of Cosmas' *Sermon Against the Heretics,* the Russian scholar Popruzhenko, Cosmas wrote between 977 and 1014. Since Patriarch Theophylact, who died in 956, knew nothing of Bogomil, while to Cosmas he was the heresiarch *par excellence,* it follows that Bogomil must have secured leadership of the movement some time between the date of Theophylact's letter (which is not known) and the date of the death of Tsar Peter, in whose reign Cosmas affirms Bogomil made his appearance. Hence, roughly speaking, the date falls between 956 (or some years earlier) and 969. Moreover, Bogomil must have died sometime before the date of Cosmas' writing (earliest 977), for this writer speaks of him in the past tense. Unsatisfactory as this approximation is, it affords some idea of the period during which Bogomil lived. The *Synodical of Tsar Boris* (1211) gives a list of Bogomil's " apostles "—apparently leaders of the movement in various territories—but several of them are known to have lived over a century later than Bogomil. Thus it would not be safe to affirm that the list comprises the names of his immediate associates or successors.

What was " the ancient and newly-appeared " heresy which had caused the good Tsar Peter so much concern and had stirred Cosmas to such a pitch of denunciatory zeal? It must be realized, first of all, that no sources of their teaching coming from the members of the group are extant. All that is known about their doctrinal positions comes from their professed opponents. Cosmas, for instance, was their pronounced antagonist. If the thesis of Blagoev were to be accepted,[17] that

[15] This is a pun on the name of Bogomil (Theophilos), " the beloved of God," Bogu ne mil means " not beloved of God."

[16] Popruzhenko, *op. cit.,* p. 2.

[17] Blagoev, N. P., *op. cit. passim.*

Cosmas simply copied Petrus Sicilus' *History of the Manichees*[19] and other Greek authors well known in Bulgaria, there could be no talk of teachings of the Bogomils. But it must be remembered that Bogomilism was genetically related to the Manichæan and the Paulician tenets, and therefore the similarity of its teaching to the former need not necessarily be taken as clear proof that a description of it has been bodily copied from the former. Besides, one cannot feel certain that the tenets ascribed to Bogomils by Cosmas were in every instance and in every particular correctly and unbiasedly stated. It must, however, be conceded that Cosmas knew the Bogomils personally and lived close enough to the beginnings of the movement to be able, if willing to be fair, correctly to portray its original, undeveloped and unmodified state. But whether or not he did so, or to what extent he may be trusted, is at present impossible to say.

In his *Sermon,* Cosmas plainly affirms that the Bogomils were dualists, who like the Gnostics of old held that the material world had been created not by the good God, the Father of Jesus the Christ, but by the devil.[20] Although Cosmas did not go into details in elaborating this teaching, it is obvious that it formed the foundation of the entire system. As dualists they logically taught renunciation of the world and insisted upon strictly ascetic ethical practises. Cosmas describes them as meek in deportment, gentle, modest and quiet, given assiduously to fasting and other self-mortification. " For the heretics outwardly appear like sheep—meek, humble and quiet, visibly pallid from their hypocritical fasting." [21] They ate no meat and drank no wine. Theoretically, marriage was forbidden them, for it implied continuation and extension of the kingdom of evil. They lived in all respects an austere, strictly ascetic moral life.

Since the Old Testament speaks of the creator of the

[19] MPG., CIV, col. 1240ff.
[20] Popruzhenko, *op. cit.*, p. 28, 37.
[21] Popruzhenko, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

world as God, they rejected it and adhered only to the New.[22] In their interpretations of the Scriptures they came surprisingly near to modern conclusions, employing fundamentally rationalistic methods in their exegesis. Cosmas reports that "since they call the devil the creator, they deny that Christ performed miracles. On hearing the gospel writer who mightily affirms the miracles of the Lord, they subvert the words to their own ruin, saying: 'Christ neither gave sight to the blind, nor healed the lame, nor raised a dead man; these are only parables and images employed to indicate healing of sins.' They likewise do not believe the gospel writer who wrote that the multitude in the desert were fed with five loaves of bread; they say, 'It was not with loaves of bread, but with the four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles.'" [23] Too bad that the Bogomils had to mar such a perfectly good bit of biblical criticism by silly allegorizing!

Furthermore, the Bogomils rejected the historic Christian church in all its branches as false, and with it rejected its orders, rites and doctrines. They ridiculed the reverence paid to the cross on the ground that since it represented the tree on which the Jews had crucified Jesus, it should by all means be held in horror and detestation as an instrument of murder.[24] They called icons idols, and rejected the worship of saints as well as of the Virgin Mary. Cosmas affirms that the Bogomils "went so far astray about her that their words and insolence cannot be set down in these books.[25] Furthermore, they fulminated against the liturgy and the vestments. As for prayers, they acknowledged as rightful only the Lord's Prayer, which they recited four times a day and as many times a night. They categorically rejected all holy days and all sacraments. They confessed and gave absolution one to another.[26] Cosmas is especially indignant that this latter custom was in vogue among both sexes.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 25, 31.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

As for the protest of the Bogomils against the social and political oppression and injustice, Cosmas is disappointingly and exasperatingly brief in describing it. He merely remarks that " they teach their own people not to obey their masters; they blaspheme the wealthy, hate their fathers (according to another reading, the tsar), ridicule the elders, condemn the nobles, regard as vile in the sight of God those who serve the tsar, and forbid all slaves to obey their masters." [27] In spite of its regrettable brevity, it is possible to discern in this diatribe the rôle which the Bogomils, who came from among the common people and were led by ordinary parochial priests, played in an attempt to bring relief and liberation to the enslaved masses. They represented the latter's protest against the tendency toward serfdom, and in behalf of economic justice and recovery of land ownership on the part of the common people. They undoubtedly represented likewise the patriotic Bulgarian party opposed to the bolyars (nobles) because of their selfish and cruel policy of grinding the common peasantry into dust.[28]

Naturally, a strictly ascetic régime, imposing upon its adherents non-marriage and the consequent childlessness, would have quickly led to the group's extinction. Under the stress of circumstances and need of self-preservation, the Bogomils developed, just like the Manichees had done before them, a double-standard which effectually insured the continuance of the movement. The adherents were ultimately divided into two groups: the full-fledged members, " the perfect," who were bound by a solemn pledge to observe all the rigors of the ascetic régime, and " hearers," who constituted a kind of life-long novitiate. Of course the former, who comprised the élite of the society, were comparatively few in number, and were supported by the far more numerous class of the " hearers." The " perfect " zealously gave themselves to missionary work, traveling from place to place and preaching their gospel of

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[28] Cf. Slatarsky, W. N., *Geschichte der Bulgaren*, Leipzig, 1918, p. 65.

world-rejection and other-worldliness, and fulminating their fiery denunciations of the evils of this world. The " hearers " could marry and were permitted to engage in any honorable occupation.

During the reign of Tsar Samuel (980-1014) the conditions were favorable for the expansion of Bogomilism as well as Manichæism and Paulicianism. Since Eastern Bulgaria had become an imperial province, having been conquered by Emperor John Tsimisces (972), Tsar Samuel found it necessary to court the favor of all the groups in his remaining dominions in order to secure their loyalty. Hence, the Bogomil, Manichæan, and Paulician missionaries were enabled to undertake an energetic missionary program throughout Western Bulgaria, along the Dalmatian coast, and to penetrate into Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (then known as Hum). The growth of the Bogomil groups was so considerable that they developed two distinct wings, known as the Bulgarian Order and the Dragovitian Order. The former seems to have been closer to the Orthodox tenets than the latter, which professed strict dualism. As could be expected, the Dragovitian Order centered about the ancient settlements of the Manichees and the Paulicians, namely the districts of Philoppopolis and Thrace, and made great headway in Macedonia, especially about Salonica and Moglen. Tsar Samuel's indulgent attitude toward this missionary zeal made him suspected of membership in the group; but he personally was Orthodox.

When even Western Bulgaria was conquered, in 1018, by the warlike Emperor Basil II, " the Bulgarslayer," the spiritual level of the Orthodox Church fell even lower than it had been before. Subjected to the jurisdiction of the Constantinopolitan patriarch, the Bulgarian church became a prey to the cupidity and greed of the Greek higher clergy. The Bulgarians, regarded as " barbarians," lost control over their churches and monasteries, which were regarded as spoils to enrich the new masters.

Under such lamentable conditions, the opponents of the Orthodox Church, the Bogomils as well as the Manichees, came to play the rôle of Bulgarian patriots who fought against the hated imperial power both in church and state. As is abundantly attested in the *Alexiad* of Anna Comnena, Thrace and Macedonia especially were centers of their anti-governmental, revolutionary activity which went hand in hand with their zealous missionary labors.

In spite of these rigors, the movement spread into Constantinople itself and to Asia Minor. When Emperor Alexius I, freed from the anxiety caused him by the Crusaders and the invading army of Bohemund of Tarentum (Bohemund died in 1111), finally turned his attention to the Bogomils, he began to persecute them openly. He captured their leader, Basil, brought him to Constantinople, and by ethically somewhat dubious ruse which Anna Comnena regarded as clever diplomacy, secured a confession from him. When Basil refused to recant his teaching, he was burned at the stake, in 1118.

But the persecution did not arrest the growth of the movement; the increasing tyranny of the government and the church drove hosts of common people into the congregations of the Bogomils, so that according to the *Vita* of St. Hilarion of Moglen,[29] their influence in the second half of the twelfth century grew stronger than ever.

As already stated, the movement spread into Serbia. But it did not strike a deep root there, due to the prompt and energetic action of the first great ruler of Serbia, Grand Zhupan Stephen Nemanya (1168-1195), who drove the Bogomils, who had taken up arms against him, out of the country. They took refuge in the territory of Hum, ruled then by Stephen's brother, Miroslav, who was at enmity with the former. It was for this reason that he was glad to give shelter to the enemies of Stephen. Miroslav had married the sister of the ban of neighboring Bosnia, Kulin, and the two rulers ultimately came to

[29] Cf. Kaluzniacki, E.: *Werke des Patriarchen von Bulgarien, Euthymius.* Wien, 1901.

share the same policy regarding the Bogomils. In time the territories of Bosnia and Hum became predominantly Bogomil, and even the rulers of these territories not infrequently were zealous adherents of the movement. Nowhere have the Bogomils gained greater influence and dominance and come nearer to raising their communion to the status of a national church than in these territories.

Ban Kulin of Bosnia found it expedient to favor the Bogomil movement, and finally even to join it, along with his whole family, on account of political reasons. The independence of his country was threatened by the expansionist policy of the ambitious Hungarian king, Béla III, who was supported in his designs by Pope Innocent III. The latter was animated by a lively desire to recover the ancient papal diocese, the Illyricum, for himself, and decided to make use of the Hungarian king for pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for him.

When sometime between 1190-1199 Kulin and his family, together with some ten thousand subjects, adopted the Patarene creed, the excuse for an armed intervention was complete. The policies of Kulin were thus singularly ill-advised: they gave the Hungarian king, now Emerich (for Béla had died in 1196), an excuse to pose as the defender of the faith. With the encouragement of the pope, Emerich sent an ultimatum to Kulin demanding his return, together with all his subjects, to Roman Catholicism, on pain of an armed invasion. Conscious of his powerlessness to withstand an armed attack, Kulin acceded, and even though we do not know the details, it is nevertheless a matter of historical record that with him the representatives of the Patarenes also made their submission in behalf of their entire community. Thus Pope Innocent triumphed in Bosnia without any bloodshed. As Rački remarks, the church " did not find in Kulin a Bosnian Raymond, nor in King Emerich a Simon de Montfort." [30]

[30] Rački, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

But the papal victory was only temporary. The submission had been a forced one, and the Patarene community had no intention to abide by it. By the reign of Pope Honorius III (1216-1227), it was commonly acknowledged that Bosnia again swarmed with "heretics." But this time the Hungarian king, Andrew II, had his hands full with a revolt of his own nobles and could not undertake any punitive expedition against Bosnia. Hence the Patarenes were left in peace, till the successor of Honorius, Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241), took the matter in hand. He gained great fame for his zeal in exterminating the French Cathars. He called upon John, the ruler of Srem, to lead a crusade against the Bosniacs. John consented to lead the expedition and even accepted 200 silver marks toward the project, but thereafter did nothing; all remonstrances of Gregory proved ineffective.

Encouraged by the ineffectiveness of the measures adopted against them, the Patarenes now felt strong enough to adopt aggressive measures for their protection. They went so far as to depose the ruling Roman Catholic ban, Stephen, and to elevate to the throne a Patarene by birth and education, Matthew Ninoslav (1232-1250). Thus in the third decade of the thirteenth century Bosnia was once more a Patarene country *par excellence;* for the ban, the nobles and a majority of the population adhered to their faith. As reported by the papal legate, even the bishop of the Roman Catholic diocese, "ex simplicitate" held the Patarenes for good Christians.

Pope Gregory could not permit such a state of affairs. After attempting to settle it by an emissary, he called upon the Hungarian king, Andrew II, to lead another crusade into Bosnia. This time the invasion, under the leadership of Andrew's son, Coloman—to whom Bosnia had been ceded—actually took place. At first Ban Matthew Ninoslav, with his Patarene Bosniacs, valiantly defended the national independence, and it was not until after three years of fighting that (in 1237) Coloman gained victory.

But in 1240 Matthew Ninoslav, with the help of the Republic of Dubrovnik, regained his throne. The terrible Tartar invasion of Hungary (1241) prevented the Hungarian king from interfering with him. Matthew Ninoslav was left in the undisturbed possession of his banship, and under his fostering care the Patarene church became the main ecclesiastical organization in the country.

By this time the strength of the Bogomil movement, known in different countries under different names, was remarkable. According to the testimony of a former adherent of the movement who became an inquisitor, there were sixteen separate organizations of the " Cathars," which he calls churches: they counted not an inconsiderable number of adherents and their communions extended from the Black Sea and the Bosphorus to the Atlantic Ocean. They were especially numerous in the Balkans, in Northern Italy and in Southern France, but were found in Germany and England as well.

A detailed recital of their fortunes in Bosnia and Hum would be tedious. The Patarene communities played either considerable or dominant rôles in the religious and political life of these countries. The head of the Patarene group, known as ded, was officially recognized as equal in rank to the Roman Catholic bishop. Because of Patarene strength, the bans, later kings of Bosnia and of Hum, found it impossible, no matter what their own personal religious affiliation, to break with them, or to persecute them for long, for they needed their support against the ever-lurking and ever-imminent danger of the Hungarian subjugation.

Moreover, the period of the Babylonian captivity of the papacy and the subsequent period of the Great Schism were not conducive to a strengthening of the Roman Catholic power. Consequently we find Patarenes of Bosnia and Hum not only left in undisturbed profession of their faith, but gaining ever greater influence with the nobles as well as the common people. Thus, for instance, the inhabitants of the city of Srebrenitsa

were, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, reported to have been "all of the Bogomil heresy." The flourishing commercial center, Dubrovnik, was surrounded by Patarenes, who enjoyed the right of citizenship in the republic. Some of the greatest nobles of Bosnia and Hum belonged to the group.

Emerging from the chaos into which the Great Schism had plunged it, the church, in the person of Pope Eugenius IV (1431-1447), again addressed itself to the task of suppressing the Bosniac heresy. Much was expected from the Council of Basle, which was to deal not only with the Calixtines and the Taborites of Bohemia, but with the Patarenes of Bosnia as well. But nothing of great moment was accomplished, although the council went so far as to send an inquisitor to the country.

The situation seemed to improve, as far as the policy of the Roman Church was concerned, after the death of King Stephen Tvrtko II Tvrtkovich (1443). He was succeeded by Stephen Thomas (1443-1461), whose claim to the throne was weak, and who therefore tried to strengthen his position by seeking the support of the Holy See. With that purpose in view he, a Patarene born, became a Roman Catholic and gave the Roman clergy a free hand in his land. But the result was most disastrous: persecuted in Bosnia, the Patarenes fled into Hum, where they were gladly received by its Patarene ruler, Herzog Stephen. Moreover, this policy proved suicidal in view of the steady onrush of the Mohammedan armies into the Balkans. The continuous struggles for the suppression of the Patarenes greatly aided the Turks in conquering the country: they not only weakened Bosnia, but led to an actual military union between the Patarenes and the Turks against the Catholics. The Herzog of Hum, Stephen, two months after the fall of Constantinople, signed himself "by the grace of God and of the great monarch the Emperor Emir-Sultan, Mohammed, the Herzog of St. Sava." Sultan Mohammed II conquered Serbia by 1459, and was then ready to invade Bosnia.

King Stephen Thomas appealed for help to the papacy. The papacy, in turn, appealed to the Hungarian king, Matthias, to come to the rescue of the Bosnian ruler. But it was too late. The Turkish armies invaded Bosnia in 1459, and although they did not conquer it immediately, its doom was sealed. Mohammed's second invasion in 1463 was so overwhelming that all defense was in vain. The end had come, and this end was not a little facilitated by the unwise persecuting policy of the Bosnian king which drove the Patarenes to give aid to the Turkish armies. The Patarenes of Bosnia and Herzegovina in large numbers deserted to Islam. Thus the Bogomil and Patarene movements practically came to an end with the Turkish conquest of the Balkans.

"CONSIDER THE LILIES"

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To THE late Dr. C. F. Burney we owe the proof, which he adduced at length in his *The Poetry of the Old Testament,* of the formal connection of much of Jesus' teaching with the Hebrew poetry of the Old Testament with respect to its peculiar features of parallelism and rhythm. This poetical form was intended by Jesus as an aid to the memory of his hearers. It is to be found in all the sources which go to form the Gospels and must go back to Jesus in an original Aramaic form; otherwise one would have the difficult task of believing, as Doctor Burney points out, "that the different authors of the sources, if they possessed merely a vague recollection or tradition of the sayings, must have set themselves, one and all, to dress them in a parallelistic and rhythmical form . . . and so doing should have produced results which are essentially identical in form."

The following are a few examples of the many that Doctor Burney offers of the synonymous type of parallelism, in which the second line repeats the thought of the first:

MARK 10:38=MATTHEW 20:22

"Ye know not what ye ask.
Can ye drink of the cup which I drink?
Or be baptized with the baptism wherewith I am baptized?"

MARK 3:4=LUKE 6:9

"Is it lawful on the sabbath to do good or to do harm?
To save a life or to kill?"

LUKE 12:22, 23=MATTHEW 6:25

"Be not anxious for your life, what ye shall eat,
Neither for your body, what ye shall put on:
Is not the life more than meat?
And the body than raiment?"

I quote only the one type of parallelism, it alone having a bearing on the following study.

Reading the text of Matthew, chapter 6, again recently, it occurred to me that verses 28 (last half) and 29, if Burney's conclusions as to Jesus' use of the poetic form were correct, might be expected to be phrased in similar fashion to verse 26, which contains a companion illustration.

Verse 26, arranging it in poetic stichoi, reads as follows:

> "Behold the birds of the heaven:
> They sow not,
> Neither do they reap,
> Nor gather into barns;
> And your heavenly Father feedeth them."

Here we have a consecutive series of actions—sowing, reaping, storing—which picture the method by which grain becomes available for the daily needs of men.

Verses 28, 29, on the other hand, read thus:

> "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow;
> They toil not,
> Neither do they spin;
> Yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory
> was not arrayed like one of these."

Here the lily is presented as a thing of beauty, though as doing no work itself to bring about this beauty, yet there is not a similar consecutive series of actions to that of verse 26. If with respect to the birds mention is made of the chief actions through which man toilsomely produces his bread, then with respect to the lily one would look for a similar series of actions by which man toilsomely secures his clothing. The fact that the lilies are spoken of as "the lilies of the field," answering to "the birds of the heaven," suggests that a parallel statement of things they do not do is to be given. In such companion illustrations as those of "the men of Nineveh" and "the queen of the south" (Matt. 12:41, 42), and of the "new cloak" and

"new wine" (Luke 5: 36, 37), the phrase by phrase likeness in phraseology will be seen to be very close, especially if read in a modern translation as that of Moffatt.

If the foregoing surmise were correct, then that series of actions, comprising the saying as it came originally from Jesus' lips, would have been in the Aramaic text underlying the Greek of Matthew 6: 28, 29 and of the parallel passage, Luke 12: 27. I therefore set myself the task of endeavoring to recover the series.

The activity of verse 28 I conjectured to be that of flax culture.[1] The mode of its cultivation and preparation for use involves a number of operations, as planting, retting or rotting, scutching, combing, spinning, weaving.[2] The major operations in grain-growing mentioned in verse 26 are sowing, reaping, storing. I shall endeavor to present grounds for thinking that those mentioned in verse 28 with respect to flax culture were, in the original form of the saying, scutching, spinning, weaving.

Omitting the question of *πῶς αὐξάνουσιν* for the time being, we will take up that of *οὐ κοπιῶσιν οὐδὲ νήθουσιν.* I quote from Nestle's text. A. B. Bruce has this critical note on verse 28 in the *Expositor's Greek Testament:* "א B have plurals (W. H.). The singulars are a grammatical correction (*κρινα* neut. pl. nom.) wholly unnecessary. The lilies are viewed singly."

As an explanation of *κοπιῶσιν, νήθουσιν* Bruce (*ibid.*) offers from Rosenmüller: "illud virorum est, qui agrum colunt, hoc mulierum domisedarum." These are the exact words of Wet-

[1] The activity might very well be that of the preparation of wool, of which the sequence of acts would be largely the same. I incline to the view that the reference is to flax because the companion passage has to do with grain-growing, with which flax-growing was allied. Krauss, *Talmudische Archäologie,* Vol. I, p. 138f., states that flax occupied a prominent place in the agriculture of the Jews; a part of their holdings was devoted to flax, which perhaps afforded a better return than wheat; the linen manufactures of Bethshean (Scythopolis) were especially prized, less those of Arbela, and it may be assumed that these places, as generally all Galilee, were the places of its original production. I came across the humorous suggestion lately in my reading—I am unable to recover the reference—that one reason why the Hebrew nomad on the desert fringe thought of Canaan as the "Promised Land," as he looked across Jordan from his flocks of sheep, was because it promised him some relief from the irritation of his woolen clothing!

[2] For the description of ancient flax culture and its preparation, see Pliny XIX. 16-18; Wilkinson, *The Ancient Egyptians,* Vol. II, pp. 87ff.; Hugo Blümner, *Technologie und Terminologie der Gewerbe und Künste bei Griechen und Römern,* Vol. I, pp. 178ff.; Krauss, *Talmudische Archäologie,* Vol. I, pp. 138ff.; and the article on "Flax" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica,* 11th ed.

stein on this text, to whom this explanation, as found in various modern commentaries, doubtless goes back. So Plummer, in *The International Critical Commentary* on Luke 12:27: "κοπιᾷ . . . covers the works of men, νήθει that of women." This explanation takes it for granted that the spheres of labor of the two sexes were well defined. From what one may gather of the extent and character of the tasks assigned to women in the East, one is inclined to doubt the explanation. On the other hand, Pliny, speaking of the preparation of the fiber as conducted in Egypt (*N.H.* XIX. 1), says: "Men are not ashamed to prepare it"—a note which leads one to think that either Pliny or the Egyptians thought that it was scarcely men's work! Wetstein's words do, however, hint at labor in sequence, field work and house work on a similar task, though Bruce (*ibid.*) does not so interpret the clauses, his explanation being: "The former verb seems to point to the toil whereby bread is earned, with backward glance at the conditions of human growth; the latter to the lighter work, whereby *clothing,* the new subject of remark, is prepared." If notwithstanding we take both clauses to refer to flax culture, the sequence is very loose, field work and spinning, as over against the very closely related tasks of sowing, reaping, storing of verse 26. The terms of verse 28 differ too, in that the one term includes a number of separate acts—sowing, weeding, etc., everything having to do with the field culture of flax; the other has reference to one definite act—spinning. Is it possible that κοπιῶσιν may refer, not to field labor particularly, but to a definite act in a series relating to flax culture?

The question is as to the Aramaic word in the saying as originally spoken by Jesus. In the *Midrash Rabba* on Genesis 7:1 this allusion occurs to the preparation of flax: "The more the flax-worker who knows that his flax is of good quality crushes (or pounds, beats כתש) it, the more it is improved; and the longer he strikes against it (or knocks it נקש Hiph.; here מקישׁ עליה) the more it is improved. But when he knows that

his flax is of poor quality, he scarcely strikes against it once before it splits (or bursts פקע)."

This corresponds fairly to the description of the rolling and scutching operations in the preparing of flax as described in the *Encyc. Brit.* (11th ed., article on "Flax"): "For ordinary water-retted flax [the operation by which flax is softened] two operations are required, first breaking and then scutching, and these are done either by hand labour or by means of small scutching or lint mills. . . The breaking is done . . . in order to thoroughly break the woody material or 'boon' of the straw, while the broken 'shoves' are beaten out by suspending the fiber in a machine fitted with a series of revolving blades, which, striking violently against the flax, shake out the bruised and broken woody cores."

In the foregoing selection from the *Midrash Rabba,* נקש refers to the scutching process, the hitting of the flax straw to separate the woody core from the fiber. A few instances of this verb occur in the Old Testament, in the sense of *knock, strike,* though in the sense of *bringing down* a bird, with a certain kind of stick, as *B. D. B.* suggests. However, it appears in the New Hebrew as *knock, strike,* and in the Aramaic of Dan. 5:6 of the knees knocking against one another.

We may imagine, then, Jesus making reference, in the original saying, to the scutching process, and using the word נקש to describe it. The question is what word the Greek translator employed in translating it. If he understood the figure, the Greek word he selected would bear the meaning, *strike, hit.* The word that appears in our MSS. is κοπιάω. This means *work hard, toil, be tired, grow weary.* It, however, goes back to κόπος, which means not merely *toil, weariness,* but also *a striking, beating,* going back as it does to κόπτω; but in no authority that I have been able to consult does κοπιάω have the meaning *strike, beat,* and that is what is wanted here.

The MSS. give a variety of readings for the word under discussion: κοπίουσιν (B.33), κοπιῶσιν (א.1), κοπιᾷ (B—Luke 12:

27). Now the verb that might here conceivably correctly translate עָמַל is κόπτω. I would suggest that it was κόπτω that was actually used by the translator, and in the plural—κόπτουσιν—because the lilies were viewed singly. Almost from the first, a copyist, because the two forms were so nearly alike and he was either not following the thought closely or was unacquainted with the processes of flax culture, possibly because the Ms. was illegible, mistook κόπτουσιν for κοπίουσιν. This was then subsequently taken to be from κοπιάω and the form a confusion with an -εω verb (of which confusion there are examples in the New Testament Greek, see Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research*, p. 341) and it was corrected by later copyists, on the one hand to κοπιῶσιν, and on the other, under the influence of the neuter plural subject κρίνα to κοπιᾷ.

The foregoing suggestion furnishes a reasonable explanation of the various readings of the text and also furnishes a possible word for the process of scutching, κόπτω[8], *strike*, so *scutch*.

Further, in Luke 12:27 D a syrr. cur. sin. have πῶς οὔτε νήθει οὔτε ὑφαίνει, omitting αὐξάνει· οὐ κοπιᾷ of the TR. This reading Nestle accepts. This furnishes grounds for the possibility that the early form of the saying was καταμαθετε τα κρινα του ἀγρου πως αυξανουσιν· ου κοπτουσιν ουτε νηθουσιν ουτε υφαινουσιν. Some time after the initial error of κοπίουσιν for κόπτουσιν was committed, the writers of Matthew and Luke made choice of this material. The picture not being now understood as one coherent whole, a deflation occurred, resulting in one tradition of

[8] I have found no instance in Greek of κόπτω as referring to this process. In the famous passage in Aristophanes (*Lys.*, Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, 1.576), where there is mention of a process in the preparation of wool somewhat corresponding to the scutching process in flax, the verb used is ἐκραβδίζειν. This is employed in the passage in a figurative sense: it may not necessarily be the verb usually used of the actual process. It is interesting to note that in rabbinical sources the word for *flail* is קוֹפְנָה, the Greek κόπανον. I have found, however, no references to the use of the קוֹפְנָה for the scutching process, though the resemblances between the operations of flailing and scutching are very close. Indeed, the humble rolling-pin could be put to other use, in the separating of the flax-seed (j. Sabb. 7, 10a 52).

the saying as it appears in Matthew, and another as it appears in Luke. Luke substituted for *καταμάθετε* his more favorite verb *κατανοήσατε*. Other changes subsequently occurred in each, and in Luke's text an alternative reading developed by an assimilation to the text of Matthew.

To come back to *πῶς αὐξάνουσιν*. What verb in the Aramaic is behind this? Various Hebrew words are selected by the translators of the New Testament into Hebrew to express *αὐξάνω*. Salkinson-Ginsburg has עלה; the edition of the British and Foreign Bible Society has צמח; the London Society edition has גדל. There is another verb, however, פרה, which in the Classical Hebrew means *bear fruit, be fruitful,* which in the New Hebrew and Aramaic shades into the meaning *grow.* Allied with this word is פרח *bud, sprout, send out shoots, blossom.* Now it is just possible that פרח was the word in the original saying and that the Greek translator, having the idea *bud, sprout* in mind, translated it by *αὐξάνω, grow, increase,* when he should have translated it by *ἀνθέω blossom, bloom.* I hazard the conjecture, however, that mistaking ח for ה, he by error read the text פרה, which he translated correctly by *αὐξάνω*. What he should have read was פרח. This verb occurs in those fine words of Isa. 35 : 2b ותגל ערבה ותפרח כחבצלת. "And the desert shall rejoice, and blossom as the rose," which in the LXX appears as *ἀγαλλιάσθω ἔρημος καὶ ἀνθείτω ὡς κρίνον*. Is it possible that this beautiful figure in Isaiah is behind this phrase in the passage under discussion?

As it stands now in Matthew and Luke the phrase *πῶς αὐξάνουσιν* breaks the parallelism of phrasing with the companion passage. The phrases "what ye shall eat" and "what ye shall put on" that occur in Matthew 6 : 25 and Luke 12 : 22 make it possible that some such phrase as "how they eat" may have had a place originally in the passage referring to the birds. If so, the original form of the sayings may have been the following:

"Behold the birds of the heaven, how they eat;
They sow not,
Neither do they reap,
Nor gather into barns,
And your heavenly Father feedeth them.

"Consider the lilies of the field, how they bloom;
They scutch not,
Neither do they spin,
Nor do they weave,
Yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory
was not arrayed like one of these."

On the other hand, the additional phrases do not add greatly to the passages, and it may be that the phrase underlying *πῶς αὐξάνουσιν* was an early addition to Jesus' saying of some prosaically-minded Christian teacher.

Thus I think that the original saying underlying Matthew 6:28, 29 was in a form admitting this English translation: "Consider the lilies of the field, how they bloom! They scutch not, neither do they spin nor weave; yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these." This gives a full parallel to the companion saying about the birds; it presents a regular sequence of acts; and it removes the difficulties of the text.

Moulton & Milligan, *Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament,* add the following interesting comment to their note on *κοπιάω*: "An uncommon usage is found in P Leid X$^{v.\ 27}$ (iii/iv A.D.), where in a recipe for making silver the following direction occurs—*καὶ ἔμβαλε τὴν πίσσαν τὴν ξηράν, ἕως κοπιάσῃ*, 'et injicito picem siccam, donec saturatum sit' (Ed.)." Doctor Milligan was kind enough to send me the full citation of this passage. Apparently the recipe is one for making bronze plate, not for silver, and I would venture the following translation of the main part of the reading: "Cups (?) of tin 1; cups (?) of

Galatian copper ½. Melt the copper, then the tin, stirring at the same time with an iron (rod), and throw in dry pitch, until it (the mixture?) comes to rest (or, becomes quiet); then pour out, and again melt, using split alum instead of pitch, and then pour out."

The recipe has to do with the smelting of bronze in ancient times. The pitch could have no effect on the metal that was in the process of being smelted; it would serve to prevent oxidation of the metal by the air while the process was going on, or remove impurities.

Deriving their meaning from this Ms., the new edition of Liddell & Scott gives a third reading of κοπιάω as "κοπάζω," *come to rest; arrive at a state of saturation.* So far as one may hazard a conjecture from such an isolated reading, "come to rest" would appear to be the better reading, the subsidence of the boiling of the metal being probably the point in question.

"SHALL WE MAKE THEM LAUGH?"

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"We are witnessing the suicide of a social order and our descendants will marvel at our madness." By this terse statement, made more than a decade ago, and reiterated again and again on many an auspicious occasion, Dean Inge laid the foundations of discouragement for the intelligentsia of the English-speaking world and supplied a charter to the now swiftly growing school of dyspeptic prophets. Gloomy erudition has conjured up champions to substantiate this dictum from many departments of modern scientific investigation, until enervating pessimism has come to be regarded as the reasonable mood of the hour and the myth of automatic progress has been successfully relegated to the limbo of misguided fancies.

Unsuspecting biologists have been pressed into the service, and we learn that the human species is biologically deteriorating, which gives us cause for genuine alarm if we fail to appreciate that many millenniums must elapse before deterioration will result in universal decreptitude.

Psychologists have been subpoenaed to bear witness that the "mind of the world is seen to be the unstable, credulous, irrational, simple and immoral mind of the mob," although upon cross-examination our psychologists might be forced to admit that probably the mind of the world has never been anything else.

Most eloquent and convincing of all testimonies is that of the unhappy economist, who cuts into what little reserve optimism there may still be at large by telling us that our economic machine is running down, that our industrial civilization is breaking under its own weight, that revolution is in the offing and all the values built up by years of arduous labor and administration are destined to crash as did the stock market in 1929.

All hope of revival through the climb of the economic curve is obliterated from our eyes as we hear the creaking of the machinery which is soon to bring us to certain doom.

To this terrific burden which has already worn Atlas to a frazzle is added the weight of moral discouragement. For we are told that professional teachers of ethics are shaking their heads and despairing of the future because humanity has rebelled against the old authorities without raising up new ones, and in consequence we are morally adrift without rudder or compass, and debauchery is just about to win the day.

There is no need of hearing more witnesses. We are on the road to hell and can only gamble on the fortitude and heroic resignation of humanity to enter the portals of damnation "With head uplifted and a smiling face." There is at least some comfort available in the thought that in a realm where fires never go out assets can never become frozen.

It was doubtless a healthful reaction to this kind of philosophy of doom that prompted one of my sensible friends to plead with me the other day to use my pulpit as a vantage-point from which to disseminate the philosophy of laughter. "All the nostrums of the day are based upon a too hasty diagnosis," he said. "We have forgotten that there is such a thing in humanity as resilience, and the spokesman who sets out to make the people laugh will do more to offset the discouragement of folks than the one who only confirms them in their pessimism. We are bound to come to a clearing before long, and in the meantime let us laugh at ourselves, and thus be saved from going mad. The most serious need of the human race just now is comic relief."

But how can Job turn jester while his boils last? If he turns to fun only as a temporary means of escape, just as a fiend turns to his drug, then laughter will only flit across the present night like a lightning-bug, adding a touch of beauty to the darkness, but still leaving it without adequate illumination. If we are to be saved by laughter at all it must be the laughter of

understanding rather than of escape. We are today in possession of sufficient knowledge and power to establish social control. What we lack is poise and a wholesome sense of relative values. If a freshened sense of humor will help us to achieve these, my friend is right, and we can be prodded by humor into a wiser appraisal of life's assets and delivered from the gloom which feeds itself only upon facts that are suited to its taste. In its periods of greatest achievement humanity has always been good-humored, and it may be that there is a definite connection between the readiness to laugh and the readiness to work. If in this era of the blues we can throw off the pathological seriousness of the reformer and go gaily to the task of reconstruction it may be that we can speed the return of hope. It was Nietzsche who said, "The mother of debauchery is not joy, but joylessness." And only a cursory reading of Nietzsche's life would make it appear that in this instance at least he knew what he was talking about.

According to Galen, laughter has in it real therapeutic value. He tells us that Æsculapius wrote comic songs to be sung by his patients in lieu of taking drugs. And Sir John Byles observed many years ago that "Cheerfulness eminently conduces to health both of body and mind. It is one of the great physicians of nature."

An experience from my own ministry is a case in point. I was calling on a parishioner who was again prostrated by the recurrence of a chronic malady, when a man by the name of Patrick O'Hara was announced. "This man," said the parishioner, as the visitor was coming up the stairs, "does me more good than my physician." I was soon to learn why. In a moment a smiling Irish face was thrust around the side of the doorway and a voice said in assumed disgust, "I'll be damned if the lazy lout ain't in bed again." May it not be if laughter has redemptive value for the sick individual it might also be used as a nostrum to hasten the recovery of sick society.

According to our psychologists the way to feel happy is

to laugh. For we are told that humor is an emotion, much like such emotions as anger, fear, or grief, and its physical expression is laughter. The pleasant feeling comes because we laugh, just as we feel angry because we clench our fists, or experience fear because we quake and run away. When we laugh we experience an exhilarating feeling which not only makes us happy, but also inhibits such unpleasant emotions as grief, fear and anger.

It would appear that people instinctively realize the efficacy of laughter to relieve the tension of depression, for we have it on good authority that the motion-picture industry is realizing its best return on films by Laurel and Hardy, Eddie Cantor, Will Rogers, Marie Dressler and Sophie Tucker. There has been a decided falling off of interest in the risqué love and scandal drama, and many motion-picture theaters are running a few comic vaudeville acts as bait to the laughter-hungry public. Social workers tell us that needy people are still frequenting the movies whenever they can lay their hands on a fifty-cent piece that can be spared from the slender purse, and men tramping the streets for work are as apt to spend their lunch money for a movie as they are to hunt out a cheap hash-house and fill their hungry stomachs.

We naturally recoil from considering that the church has any real responsibility in the task of making the people laugh, because we conceive of the church not as an institution for entertainment but rather for the dissemination of religious truth and moral instruction. We would rather let those who capitalize on the laughter-hunger of the masses provide the means of enjoyment while we look after weightier matters. But may it not be that our religious goods have grown a little too ponderous for popular consumption? In times when life is austere religion cannot be austere too without a decided falling off in its following. The crash of materialism affords an unusual opportunity to the church to reassert its spiritual claims and to convince folk that it stands for the "unshakables"

which can weather any depression. But in the presentation of those eternal facts it may well employ the faculty of humor to dispel the effects of economic depression and exhilarate the spirits of men into a receptive mood.

It cannot be gainsaid that American Protestantism has never been quite able to throw off the frown of its puritanical forbears. We have missed the humor of Jesus in our too ardent pietism. We preach the spiritual values of sacrifice. We embellish the invisible rewards of struggle. We canonize the characters who triumph over suffering, sorrow, and death —but who ever heard a sermon preached upon the spiritual values of wholesome, contagious laughter?

Soon after Douglas Haring went out to Japan to minister to the youth of that country in the name of Christ, he wrote a little article for *The Baptist* which amounted to a confession. He said the Japanese had taught him to laugh with Jesus. In all the days of his childhood, and on through college and seminary, he had studied the New Testament and missed its humor. Not until the laughter of the Japanese students interrupted his reading of the Gospels did he realize that Jesus was smiling when he spit out some of his invectives against the Pharisees, or that he was laughing out loud when he talked about straining out the gnat and swallowing the hairy old camel, humps and all.

Jesus must have known the power of infectious laughter to master his audiences, or the common people would never have heard him gladly, and he would never have been desired as an after-dinner speaker.

We have too much followed the leadership of the bilious in our human estimate of Jesus. Like Saint Basil of ancient day, we have been too willing to believe that laughter is one bodily affection which the founder of Christianity does not seem to have known.

Of course we have the company of many of the world's mighty minds in our neglect of laughter as being unbecoming to great thought. Plato in his *Republic* takes Homer to task

for having degraded the gods by making them laugh. And Pythagoras would avoid laughter and all pandering to tastes such as jests and vulgar tales. According to the history of Greek philosophy, Democritus is the only laughing philosopher on record—and due apologies are made for his human frailty. We have it on no less authority than the paragon Lord Chesterfield that "Fine wit and good sense never excited a laugh since the foundation of the world." Samuel Johnson declares that nobody ever heard either Pope or Swift laughing. And from antiquity we learn that the great-grandfather of Crœsus never laughed but once, and then only when he came upon an ass eating thistles.

But such testimonies only convince us that laughter has played a great part in the genius of such men as Shakespeare, Dickens, Lamb, Goethe, Voltaire, Irving, and the like, and that probably Carlyle was right when he said that one who has once laughed from the depth of his heart can never again be unredeemably bad.

On the highest authority we are bidden to cultivate the childlike mind. Then laughter, so characteristically a feature of healthy children, will also belong to the citizens of the Heavenly Kingdom. The very excellency of virtue makes men ponderous, and unless spirituality is united with a strong sense of humor we cannot make it extraordinarily attractive.

It might be proven beyond the peradventure of a doubt that humor is the handmaiden of idealism, and that only those who know how to laugh are able to be savingly serious. For it is the recognition of the actual imperfections in life which makes humor possible. Those who have sufficient hold upon the ideal sympathetically to laugh at that which falls short of it are in a fair way to try again. It was said of Henry Ward Beecher that he convinced those who came into his confessional of God's forgiveness by laughing with them at their past folly, and then, after kneeling with them as a loving parent kneels with his children he sent them forth to undertake life with confidence in

God's benevolent cooperation. The laughter which does not stop short of laughing at the "sacred self" ministers to the soul and musters the courage, to begin again.

The ablest jurist I have ever been privileged to know has to his credit a number of moral recoveries. Men say of him that his spirit is so genial that many prisoners who are brought before him are made to laugh at the very bar of justice. Not that he condones their crimes, but by some witticism he unveils to them the folly of their false choices and sends them on to serve their sentences with a better estimate of what they ought to be, because they have come to laugh at the kind of fools that they have been.

It strikes me that God must be possessed of that kind of a sense of humor, else he could not tolerate any of us. If we only could be convinced that he laughs with us when we look at our folly, we might love him better and try harder to please him.

But the question certain to be raised when we prescribe laughter as an antidote to the gloom of depression is whether or not we are recommending a specific which, like some medicines, has an undesirable reaction that may ultimately do real harm to the patient. It may be proposed that the history of humor is not all to the good, for derision, malignity, contempt, and often stark superiority have pervaded laughter in days past. In answer to this question we propose that there is a recognizable distinction between genuine laughter and the curling of the lips in scorn. The temper of these two acts may be seen to be decidedly opposite and their neural machinery is quite distinct. As Max Eastman has ably put it, "To unflesh an eye-tooth and emit short breaths or ha-has is as far from laughter as the fangs of a canine animal are from his tail. . . Not only the sneer itself, but all its disagreeable children dwelling in the words gibe, leer, jeer, scoff, flout, hoot, gird, taunt, the sardonic or cynic probe, and the lash of sarcasm, are to be got out of our way. . . It is possible, of course, that the feelings indicated in these words may mingle with laughter, as may a great vari-

ety of the moods of men, . . but they are none of them involved in the essence and generation of laughter itself, which is not an act of rejection but of acceptance." [1]

Laughter is the sweetest sign of a healthy spirit. "It begins with a flash, because the motion of the upper lip comes first, and then that lip broadens as it raises, until the teeth shine, making the mouth redder than it was. The cheeks curve, the eyes gather light and attract the brows and lashes toward them, warming their glitter with those radiant soft lines of good nature and good-will. Such living motions are more beautiful than any flower, or more brilliant than any colored light against the clouds of evening, and they are almost the source of the light in which men are enabled to struggle through life's pain and blind anxiety." [2]

Surely Christians should know what to laugh at and what to sympathize with. Through the exorcism of Jesus the demons of sarcasm, derision, and what the Germans have so fittingly called *Shadenfreude* can be cast out of our lives, and the genial laughter which is the chief thing that holds society together can be made a saving mood for ourselves and our neighbors.

But we come to the question of our paper. "Shall we make them laugh, and how?" We might as well recognize at the outset that for many of us it would be tragic to try to be funny. For those of us whose seriousness is often so intense as to border on comedy, a deliberate excursion into the ludicrous might border on tragedy. Humorists are born, not made, and the man who can tell a funny story without inflicting pain upon the polite listener belongs to that rare variety of after-dinner speakers who can come at the tired end of an over-arranged program and send his fellow-diners forth delighted that they worried through the hours of boredom to taste the best wine which had been wisely served last.

[1] Quoted from *The Sense of Humor*, Max Eastman, pp. 6, 7.
[2] Abridged from p. 6, *Op. Cit.*

We can, however, assume a genial mood as we address our audiences and so give the impression that our religion need not result in furrowed brows and drooping lips. Our news is good news and joy is never alien to those who receive it. I shall never forget the presentation of the gospel which I was privileged to experience under the able preaching of Ozora Davis. Conviction never cut deeper. Duty never seemed more compelling. I heard the call to the ministry under his preaching. And yet he did not win me by labored seriousness. It was because he punctuated his discourses with lilting expressions of genuine Christian joy that I found myself at the bar of decision. It seemed as though life were calling me. Life with its burdens, life with its tragedies, but life that can be redeemed by the spiritual optimism which is born of Christian hope and nourished with Christian joy.

May it not be that the nursery rhyme we delighted in as children holds in it the remedy for the day of depression in which we find ourselves? For we read that old Mother Hubbard betook herself to the joiners to order a coffin for the dog who, she was convinced, had fallen on sleep because the bare cupboard had done its evil work, but she returned to her sad house only to find her supposedly demised comrade in paroxysms of laughter.

THE RELIGION OF PLATO

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ENVIRONMENT throws its inevitable shadow across the pathway of every life. There is no escape from its influence. The greatest battles of life are those fought out on the battlefields of human conscience. The conflicting desires of human nature lend enchantment to this eternal contest. Plato, like all other human mortals, found himself born into an environment for which he was in no sense responsible and which he later sought to change in many respects. The date of his birth is generally recognized to be the year 427 B. C.; in the ancient city of Athens. Being the son of wealthy parents he therefore had every educational advantage that his nation could offer. At the age of twenty he become a pupil of Socrates, and for the next eight years lived in close intimacy with him. The execution of Socrates left its imperishable mark upon every phase of young Plato's thought. This tragic event bred in his formative mind a ceaseless scorn for democracy, because in his own thinking it was nothing other than the ruthless tyranny of an uncontrolled democracy that had brought about the death of Socrates, his master. Such an uncontrolled democracy, he contended, should be replaced by the rule of the wisest and the best. It is always unwise to invest authority in the common herd of humanity. It is likewise folly to teach men faster than they can learn.

Plato lived in an age in which orthodox religion was not on speaking terms with the science of the day. For more than two hundred years the philosophers of Greece had criticized Homer and his notion of the popular gods. To deviate in the least from the good old religion of their fathers meant to invite persecution and to flirt with death. Heresy could be scented quicker than a hound could scent a hare. For Socrates to

believe in God in a "higher sense" than they, meant to them that he necessarily believed in a "different sense," and they were willing to turn the "hounds of hell" on his trail whenever such was the case. This atmosphere of ignorance and intolerance failed in its attempt to bridle his tongue. He continued to proclaim his views until the deadly hemlock silenced his tongue forever. He died a martyr's death with a cheerful composure, in the full persuasion that it was God's will and the complete consummation of his mission. He looked upon death as being the highest good and the richest blessing. His beliefs were illustrated by a conscientious life and finally sealed by a martyr's death. Plato has given us a description of Socrates' death in prose more beautiful than poetry. This brief reference to Socrates is intended to illustrate the profound influence he exerted on the life of young Plato. The religion of any man can only be truly evaluated as the facts of his early training and environment are taken into consideration. Plato's affection for Socrates was so great that he later made him the central figure in his immortal *Dialogues.*

After the death of Socrates, Plato discovered himself living in a world of confusion and doubt. Prior to this time a spirit of political and social complacency had prevailed. Everybody was happy and prosperous, and nobody asked questions about the morrow. The intellectual depression prevailed to the delight of everybody. A new atmosphere, however, greeted Plato when he appeared on the scene. Time in its ruthless flight had changed everything. Happiness and prosperity had vanished, but only to be supplanted by social confusion, human discord and bloody warfare. The apparent misfit of all human institutions in society constituted a challenge to Plato's responsive mind. His attention was therefore immediately directed to an attempted adjustment of social relations. In his first Utopian book, *The Republic,* we behold a young man's dream of a city in which human life is governed by justice. In his last book, *The Laws,* we are brought face to face with another

view of human relations, in a second Utopia. He faced life with no fear of the gods. His philosophy of life may be gleaned from the following sentence: "Take hold of your lives; most of these things that distress you, you can avoid; most of these things that dominate you, you can overthrow. You can do as you will with them."

Among the most profitable years of Plato's life were those which he spent in extensive travel, obtaining wisdom from every available source, sitting at every shrine of learning, and sampling every creed. Several ambitious historians inform us that he went to Judea and was influenced for a while by the Hebrew prophets. He is also represented as having journeyed to the banks of the Ganges, where he beheld the mystic meditations of the Hindus. Such suppositions, however, appear to be only a matter of conjecture. The poise and polish of his literary style are convincing evidences of his wide and varied acquaintance. In him we detect the happy combination of the philosopher and the poet in one soul. His medium of expression is that in which truth and beauty are wedded in dignified charm. Shelley speaks of this unusual combination in the following words: "Plato exhibits the rare union of close and subtle logic with the Pythian enthusiasm of poetry, melted by the splendor and harmony of his periods into one irresistible stream of musical impressions, which hurry the persuasions onward in a breathless career."

Our immediate task is to attempt an understanding of some of the religious convictions of this intellectual giant. Christian theology has not escaped the influence of his teachings. Theologians of all creeds should not become alarmed if they discover direct Platonic influences underlying some of their most sacred doctrines. *The Dialogues* contain many passages that bear a striking resemblance to the Christian Scriptures. Such passages are not only characterized by their charming and picturesque style, but still more by the lofty moral and religious sentiments which they express. These senti-

ments are as typical of Plato as are the inimitable *Dialogues* in which they are clothed. Many of the early Church Fathers were eager to explain the striking resemblance between the doctrines of Plato and those of Christianity. James H. Snowden calls our attention to the fact that " Paul's letters are especially colored and tinctured by pagan philosophies and religious cults." Points of contact and affinity of Paul with Plato have often been pointed out. Doctor Snowden says in this connection that " Paul appears to be dipping his pen into Greek philosophy in Colossians 1 : 17, where he says that in Christ ' all things consist ' or ' hold together,' which is in line with the Greek philosophy of the divine immanence that all things ' live and move and have their being in God,' so prevalent in Greek thought, where it bordered on if it did not lose itself in pantheism.[1] Paul keeps clear of this pit, however, even though he makes his epistles speak the same language. In a similar manner Christianity appropriated Roman elements of thought, especially of law and a world empire, which fitted in with and gave a grand background to its own doctrines of law and a world kingdom. Christianity has a native affinity with all truth and absorbs and assimilates it from many sources. In its early development it appropriated Greek thought, Roman law, and pagan religious practises. The distinguishing characteristic of Christianity is its universality. All individual men are subject to the limitations placed upon them by their age, race, and thought. Luther was always German; Lincoln was always American; Plato was always Greek. The teachings of Plato will never become obsolete because they contain many timeless elements of truth which the human race, though stupid for the most part, will continue to cherish throughout the ages.

Plato was primarily interested in the solution of four problems. His first concern was the problem of truth and knowledge, which took him into a careful study of logic and epistemology. His second concern was the problem of the

[1] James H. Snowden, *What Do Present-Day Christians Believe?* p. 263.

nature of ultimate reality, which necessitated the study of metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. His third concern was the problem of the soul, which meant that he must become acquainted with the study of philosophical psychology. His fourth concern was the problem of social relations and values, which involved the study of ethics and politics. The remainder of this discussion will deal with these four problems in an attempt to unfold Plato's doctrine concerning each of them.

Concerning a Rationalized Religion

It would be incorrect to classify Plato as a mere intellectualist. He was much more than that. He maintained that the function of thought was to illumine and organize the otherwise chaotic facts of sense-experience, and thus to harmonize impulse and emotion. His interpretation of life was always expressed in terms of order and proportion. Through rational reflection he sought to attain sanity, moderation and harmony. He always looked upon reason as being the organizing power of the reflective life, and upon emotion as being chaotic and disintegrating. His constant quest was for a reflective unifying insight into reality as a whole. Reason and creative imagination were to him twin aspects of the constructive power of thought. In him we see a genius who is supreme in both orders of spiritual creativeness, that of a metaphysician on the one hand, and that of a philosophical poet on the other. His writings exhibit therefore an illustration of the profoundest thought wedded to the noblest expression. In his attempt to rationalize religion he encountered a stubborn resistance at every turn.

Socrates had previously expounded the theory that only the knowledge of concepts guarantees a true knowledge. Plato proclaims an advanced idea in which he maintains that " it is only by reflection in concepts or ideas that true and original being can be attained. From this point of view the reality of

ideas becomes the necessary condition of the possibility of scientific thought. The same result follows from the contemplation of being as such." [2] To read the imperishable *Dialogues* is to be infused with a new force of reality, because they provide for us a rational basis coupled with a logical form. In them we discover the intimation of a hope which rests, not on instinct and feeling alone, but rather on practical reason. The one foundation upon which all of his reasoning is based is that of the unique immutability of moral distinctions. It was this Platonic idea which marked an advance in the philosophy of religion that cannot be too highly praised.

Plato never relinquished the idea that the world of things is an exact copy of the world of ideas. True reality therefore cannot be known by human beings. The thought-construction which comes to man will therefore gain additional validity, for it will now be regarded, not as an arbitrary and individual invention, but rather as being the product of a deeper and more universal life. Plato sought to confine his thought to the pure motionless world of ideas. The one chief weakness of such a theory appears to lie in the fact that it recognizes no connection whatever between the world of ideas and that of ordinary phenomena. His contention is of course that there is a reality truer and more real than that of the senses. The logical conclusions of this theory led Plato to identify the good with the "truly real." The possibility of change becomes therefore a matter of utter impossibility, for, says he, "reality is uncreated, indestructible, unchanging, and indivisible."

True knowledge, according to Plato's theory, is arrived at through the activity of reason, and not through the senses alone. The senses only furnish the stimuli and the material for knowledge, but this material must be reflected upon before we can have knowledge. Sense-perception is only the occasion for obtaining knowledge; but to derive knowledge from the qualities of sense-perception alone is impossible. Whenever mental

[2] E. Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, p. 140.

reflection is brought into contact with sense-perception the resulting prodigy is what Plato terms " knowledge."

Concerning the Existence of God

The " idea of the good " is essentially the core of the Platonic system. Plato believed that the implications of this theory constitute the ultimate source or ground of all concrete existence, and the eternally real ideal or pattern of all excellence. All earthly truth is only a fragmentary apprehension of the eternal truth, all earthly good a mere copy of the eternal good, and all earthly beauty is but an imperfect reflection of the eternal beauty. God becomes therefore the changeless fulfilment of values, the unitary principle of all truth and beauty, and the eternally good. He becomes also the principle of absolute spiritual perfection, the source of all other perfections, the everlastingly real, and the guiding star of the spirit. It is this mystical vision of union with the Divine that constitutes Plato's doctrine of God. His central thesis is the theory that all order and intelligence in the world are but an imperfect expression of the divine and absolute reality.

The only justification for the existence of the world, says Plato, is that the good may find expression for itself. His argument is that God desires that all things should be as much like himself as possible. Plato is usually thought of as having been a great theist, yet we find that he failed to clothe his God in the garments of personality. His entire theistic doctrine is erected upon the theory of the impersonal nature of God. The justice and love that humanity experiences reveal an eternal justice and love which are true whether we are obedient to them or not. We are to think of such justice and love as impersonal principles, and not as being the conscious will of a personal God. It is perfectly evident that such a theory leads to the natural conclusion that while God is the world purpose, yet at the same time he is not a conscious purposer. God is therefore pictured to us as having his abode somewhere in that realm

between the world of ideas and that of actual phenomena. He accounted for the creation of the world by projecting the theory that " before creation there was this primeval potentiality of things, and out of this God fashions the world. In doing this God first creates the demiurge." This " demiurge " appears to be the energy of God at work.

Another interesting angle to Plato's doctrine in this connection is his theory that God geometrizes. He maintains that there is " something in mathematics which is necessary and cannot be set aside, . . and if I mistake not, of divine necessity; for as to the human necessity of which the many talk in this connection nothing can be more ridiculous than such an application of the words. What are these necessities of knowledge which are divine and not human? Those things without some use or knowledge of which a man cannot become a god to the world, nor a spirit, nor yet a hero, nor able earnestly to think and care for man." [3] He holds to the view that there is an eternal given element in divine experience which is not a product of divine will, which he maintains is evident from the apparent difficulties under which the divine will labors in expressing perfection in the world. The apparent purposive ongoing of the world would seem to me to refute such a superficial theory. Belief in such a mere cosmic force, or first cause, or *élan vital,* can hardly inspire hope, or devotion, or sacrifice; it cannot offer comfort to the hearts of the distressed, nor courage to embattled souls. On the other hand, a living personal God can do all of this, and in addition can inspire the self-seeking individualist into some moderation of his greed, some control of his passion. Plato clings to the opposite point of view, however. He believes that no harm will come to humanity as it worships the personified ideal of its love and hope, and such a belief may terminate in immeasurable good. He does not desire to classify his God in such a category, however.

[3] *Plato's Laws,* p. 818.

Prof. A. S. Woodburne says that " ever since the days of Plato men have identified the highest good, or the ideal, with God. Which means that the fullest, most harmonious development of the moral life is possible of realization only as life is also developed Godward." [4] If such is the condition, then humanity finds itself face to face with a great moral challenge. In the final analysis, Plato must be classified as a philosophical monist. In no uncertain terms he brands the gods of mythology as being mere creatures of the imagination. His own doctrine of God is clearly set forth in the following sentence: " Deity coincides with the idea of good, the belief in providence with the conviction that the world is the work of reason and the copy of the idea." [5] His point of distinction between the creator and the ideas is somewhat vague and uncertain. For example, when he discusses the " good," it is difficult to decide whether he means by it an idea, an attitude, a principle, a power, or a God. His beautiful philosophical poetry confuses the mind at this point.

Concerning Immortality and the Soul

Plato cherished the doctrine of the tripartite conception of man, and conceived the soul as an absolutely immaterial principle. He argued that the " psyche " or " soul " is the principle of the physical life, and is thereby the organ of the ideas. He conceived of man as composed of a union of body, soul and reason. Such a doctrine is not unlike the Pauline doctrine, which also conceives man to be composed of body, soul and spirit. It was this same tripartite conception of man that later became the permanent Christian doctrine. This Platonic doctrine surpassed all previous attempts of Greek thought on the subject of immortality. Its essence is seen in the following statement: " The soul belongs to the world above the senses, and in that only can find its true and lasting existence; the

[4] A. S. Woodburne, *The Religious Attitude*, p. 284.
[5] E. Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy* (quot.), p. 161.

possession of good or happiness, which forms the final goal of human effort, can only be attained by elevation into that higher world. The body, on the other hand, and sensual life, is the grave and prison of the soul." [6] The ultimate goal of man for Plato becomes therefore an attempted escape from this lower life of the corporeal self into the higher world of the soul. The only probability of such an escape may be accomplished " by the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself unto herself, out of all the courses of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can; the release of the soul from the chains of the body." [7]

It was inevitable that the doctrine of the preexistence of souls should take form in Plato's system, because according to his reasoning the idea is anterior to the soul, and the soul to the body. The great wealth of Platonic logic and imagination is focussed upon an attempted proof of this theory. The arguments employed to substantiate this hypothesis were those taken from the soul's desire and capacity for knowledge, its simple and indivisible nature, its essential vitality, its habit of command, and the law of contraries, or the " circle of nature." The chief weakness to be seen in such arguments is found in the one that turns upon the question of eternal ideas, which seems to bear upon the prior-existence of the soul rather than upon its after-existence. Another argument used by Plato to substantiate his theory of the preexistence of souls is based largely on his supposition that the ability to form concepts can only be explained by recollection; and thus if concepts cannot be traced by previous recollections in this life, they must spring from memories of an earlier state of existence. Such an argument is worthless today, as modern philosophers are able to explain conception without reducing it to a form of recollection. Another argument which is in bad repute today is that

[6] E. Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, p. 155.
[7] Plato, *Phædo*, p. 67.

based upon the theory that the soul is a simple substance and therefore indestructible and eternal.

The highest source of knowledge for man is reason, and it is just this part of man, says Plato, that did not originate with the body. Its function is to share directly in the nature of the ideas, while the other parts thus share only in so far as they are penetrated by reason. The origin and destiny of the soul is independent of the body, while at the same time it is immersed in the body. In this theory is to be seen Plato's strongest argument for immortality. A lengthy description of this argument may be found in his *Phædo*.

The full strength of Plato's arguments seem to be directed to the judicial issues of the earthly life and the moral significance of the soul's immortality for the present existence. In one of his famous passages he says: "If the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity. And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit, not only of their body, but of their own evil, together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom." [8]

Plato likewise advocates the doctrine of transmigration. One of the scenes sketched in his *Republic* represents souls possessed with sufficient freedom to select their own careers in their next lives before becoming reincarnated. Each soul is to choose in accordance with its own peculiar character, being attracted to attain whatever its past life has led it to appreciate. The gods exercise no interference in their choice whatever.

Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say, with Geddes, that

[8] *Phædo* (Jowett's translation), p. 488.

Plato's doctrine of immortality "is intrinsically the greatest contribution ever drawn from philosophical speculation upon the question . . , the noblest single offering that reason has yet laid upon the altar of human hope." [9] Plato was far ahead of his day, intellectually speaking. Even the later schools of Greek and Roman thought were not greatly influenced by his teachings. In the writings of Aristotle, his pet pupil, we find the question of immortality completely ignored. Plato's faith in immortality has, however, continued to live as an unquenchable hope in the minds of both the weak and the strong. This immortal flame still burns, regardless of the cold criticism of the philosopher, the gay skepticism of the poet and the egotistical sneer of the satirist.

Concerning Social Relationships and Values

There appears to be no distinction drawn by Plato between ethics and social philosophy. The nature of man can be realized only through a well-ordered society. The state justifies its existence only when it functions as an instrument of culture. It operates as the highest form of social organization in the realization of virtue on the part of its citizens. The chief instrument, therefore, that can enable the state to fulfil its high mission is education. Such a system of education would have as its principal aim the cultivation of the virtues of the self. This beautiful scheme, as conceived by Plato, would be very desirable.

His contention that the general plan of justice in the state would in turn mould the virtue of the individual was based on the theory that "the state is the individual writ large." The greatest responsibility of the state is that of the cultivation of its individual citizens into desirable members of society. His entire social and educational theory is based on the psychological analysis of the individual. The state should employ the strength of its resources in the development of the moral cul-

[9] Geddes, *The Phædo of Plato*, pp. xxvii, xxviii.

ture of its citizens. This end can best be attained, declared Plato, only as the state is ruled by an aristocracy of character and intellect. He demanded that the rulers should be elected by a process of elimination, and thus the best trained and equipped men within the state would be elected. Such a system would no doubt be unpopular with our American politicians of today. Plato has in mind an ideal state; he is describing what a state might be, and ought to be.

It seems that the political system of Plato's day was founded upon principles not in accord with the concept of justice. Having witnessed the political corruption, extreme license and grave dangers of democratic tyranny, he soon became distrustful of all the then existing political institutions, and of all other philosophies which exalted the individual above society. He maintained that the state most to be desired was one which embodied " in its laws and institutions the fundamental unity of the moral individual with the socialized state." [10] Three classes of citizens composed his ideal state, perhaps corresponding respectively to the three divisions in the soul. The first class was to consist of philosophers, whose chief passion was the love of knowledge and virtue. The rulers were to come from this class, as only the wisest and best should rule. The members of this class were also to be denied the privilege of holding private property, in order that their sense of public service might not become distorted. Imagine what American politicians would say to such a regulation of public servants! The second class was to consist of men of strong will and courage, who were to be the guardians and defenders of the state. They were to be supported entirely by state funds, and like the first class were to be denied the right to own private property. The third class was to consist of the common citizens, who were to be temperate and obedient. This third class was to hold all property, and to be composed of agriculturists, artisans,

[10] Hertzler, *The History of Utopian Thought* (quot.), p. 100.

business men and bankers. If each class performed its definite work faithfully, and all worked in mutual cadence, the result would be what Plato called "justice." He contends that the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice can be attained only through the operation of such a social state. In reply to the accusation that under such conditions the guardians would not be happy, Plato says, "our object. . . is not to make any one class preeminently happy, but to make the whole state as happy as it can be made." [11]

In addition to his communistic program concerning property, Plato also proposed that the guardians possess their wives in common. In reference to this question he says that "no one shall have a wife of his own; likewise the child shall be in common, and the parent shall not know the child, nor the child the parent." [12] He gave as his reason for such an unusual proposal the fact of the great need for unity of purpose among the guardians. Such a program, said Plato, would also develop the science of eugenics, "to bring together the best of both sexes as often as possible, and the worst as seldom as possible." [13] His discussion in this connection continues with the question of the proper relations that should be permitted under such a system, and also those which should be restrained, "if the flock is to attain the first-class excellence." [14]

In discussing human behavior, Plato believes that the three main sources from which it flows are desire, emotion, and knowledge. Will Durant has amplified this statement by saying that, "desire has its seat in the loins, and is fundamentally sexual; emotion has its seat in the heart, and is the organic resonance of experience and desire; knowledge has its seat in the head, and is the eye of desire." [15]

Utopias are only constructed by social dreamers who have

[11] *The Republic of Plato* (translated by Davies and Vaughan), p. 128.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 179, 180.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 180-183.
[14] *Ibid*, p. 183.
[15] Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, p. 30.

been depressed by the chaotic social and economic institutions amid which they live. The world has always been a cemetery of memory and tears, yet dreamers in the night continue to appear on the horizon of its hope. Plato exhibited confidence in the common sense of men of any or every class to reorganize the casual and faulty political, economic and social structure. His ideal social order would be composed of people highly harmonious and efficient, fulfilling their designated function like the numerous instruments in a perfect orchestra. In such a society, justice would mean the " effective coordination, the harmonious functioning of the groups, each in its proper place, and each making its cooperative contribution to behavior." Every individual is either " a cosmos or a chaos of desires, emotions and ideas." Justice is more than strength, it is strength characterized by harmony; the effective harmony of the whole. Intelligence and organization are for Plato the prerequisites to justice.

MEASURING WORSHIP

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WORSHIP is supposed to be the center of the church's demonstration of the meaning of religion. In the experiences of the worship hour both the individuals and the group are supposed to have an intimate sense of the presence of God and to be influenced in their attitudes and consequent conduct by the memories of this hour. The service is planned to stir emotional responses to the suggestions that are given in the hymns, prayers and exhortations of the minister or other leader of worship. The ideals of religion are exalted and the worshipers are expected to accept them and to commit themselves to that way of living. Doubts and misgivings of the individuals are to be submerged in the common faith of the group. And if worship has met the needs of the various members of the group a sympathetic strain of human fellowship should bind them together and to the Divine. Infinite resources are recalled to mind and the weakness of the individual is sustained by the strength of the family of God. Worship dramatizes the assumptions of religion and invites the worshipers to make real for themselves the possibilities of the religious way of living.

The church has spent enormous sums to clothe the worship service with dignity, awe, and reverent impressiveness. Buildings have been constructed to create feelings of adoration, aspiration and consecration. The clergy have been given a special position of respect in the community as representatives of the divine. Services have been planned with æsthetic care—elaborate rituals, beautiful music, robes, and symbols all contributing to the effects desired. A special day is set apart for worship each week and other times are given to particular celebrations. Traditions are sacredly regarded and the feeling

of timelessness is striven for as past, present, and future are blended together. The whole intent and purpose is to lift the religious experience above the ordinary and to claim special attention and devotion to all that is associated with it. Reason and logic play a very minor part, while traditional custom, suggestion, and subdued emotion are given primary attention. The spirit of holiness is in large part mystical emotionalism.

Since religious education has become more scientific in its methods every part of the processes involved has been subjected to analysis and experimentation. Questions have been raised about everything connected with the forms, practises, and ideas of worship. No consensus of agreement has been reached, but a great deal of modification of programs has been tried in an endeavor to obtain more satisfactory results. For although exact measurements have not been attained the study that has been given to the subject has revealed that there is great need for improvement, that worship has not done the thing it was assumed it ought to do in a good many situations. Experiments have been made with new rituals, with the use of music, with dramatics, with pictures and stories, with settings, with training of participants, and with selection of topics, or central themes.

Seldom, however, has there been any fair measure of the differences achieved by the reforms. A minister or a worship leader has some theory, some æsthetic hobby, some prejudice or preference, and assumes that others will feel as he does, or that he can make them do so. Materials are selected and a program is planned with certain objectives, or perhaps more or less blindly, and except for a few comments no one knows what the effect has been. Sometimes forms are carried down through many years with hardly a change with the assumption that the traditional form has a mystical value. Such is the general character of the Communion service, not only in the Episcopal and Catholic churches but also to a degree in all the

denominations. All persons, however, do not get the same satisfaction from a worship service, and the Communion does not mean the same thing, even to members of the same sect. The reason for the difference in effect is not merely in the preparation or lack of preparation that some would stress, but is related to temperament, religious experience, intellectual attitudes toward religion, associations, and emotional tendencies. It is not good education to make all adapt themselves to a given form or practise; the test of a sound educational policy is its adaptability to the varied needs and capacities of the persons concerned. If worship is to maintain its place at the center of the church's program and have the effect the church feels it ought to have some better measure of the influence of worship and the differences in the use of materials and methods must be secured. Revisions of services, development of materials, and supervision of the practise of worship must be guided by more accurately determined facts.

For some time the writer has been trying various ways of penetrating the experiences of worshipers to discover what worship means to them. He has tried different questionnaires, tests, rating scales, and descriptive records, and has been able to get certain interesting data. One of the most profitable lines of investigation seems to be with an instrument called "A Self-Study of a Worship Service." Several different forms have been used and varied situations have been studied. Graduate students, in the writer's classes in the Divinity School of The University of Chicago, have tried it out in reporting visitations to church services of different types, high school students have filled out the forms, and the rank and file of church groups have stated their reactions on it. It is a practical instrument and those who use it generally find interest in the study.

The first page of the form asks for certain identifying information regarding the person who is filling it out. It particularly asks for his practise of church attendance and habits

of worship. There is a brief explanation of the purpose of the study and how to make the record. The body of the instrument consists of a number of questions so prepared as to give the worshiper an opportunity to state his experience on each phase of the service in two ways, (1) by indicating on a graphic scale the degree of satisfaction he had in the service relative to particular parts and to the service as a whole, and (2) by making an explanatory comment as to why he makes the rating he does. The following excerpts from one of the forms will illustrate how this is done. The questions are preceded by these directions:

Record your experience as soon after the service as possible. Think carefully of the service and how you felt and responded to the various parts of the service. Read each question carefully and then in column marked "Rating" put the letter that expresses your rating according to the following scale:

Very Satisfactory Service	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	Very Unsatisfactory Service

Example

B. Could you hear the speaker and understand him?

Comment: I put rating at *B* because he was easily understood though he might have spoken louder to advantage.

If the rating had been marked *D* it would mean about average; if it were at *G* it would mean very unsatisfactory; while *A* would mean an exceptionally clear speaker.

Remember *A, B, C* express degrees of satisfactory experience and *E, F, G* degrees of unsatisfactory experience, while *D* is an average experience, without special satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

At the top of each page the rating scale is placed and the form constructed somewhat as shown. The form given here is one prepared for a study of "Holy Communion" by a group of religious-education leaders at a summer conference.

A Self-Study of Holy Communion

Very Satisfactory Experience **A B C D E F G** **Very Unsatisfactory Experience**

Rating:

1. Were all the surroundings conducive to worship?

Distractions were _____

Helpful conditions were _____

2. Did my opening private devotions have much thought or meaning?

I felt that _____

3. Did the way in which the priest opened the service help me to worship?

It made me feel _____

6. Did the recital of the Creed make me feel that I was expressing my own faith?

I felt _____

9. Did I share in all parts of the "Prayer for the whole state of Christ's church"?

I took part in _____

12. Did I realize any better God's relationship to man because of the celebration of the Communion?

My attitude _____

15. Did the sense of the presence of God seem real?

It was most real during _____

18. Did the service as a whole do me good and make me glad I came?

It made me feel that _____

Only a few questions are given but the differences in the reactions of this group of Episcopal leaders may be seen by the number who rated these parts of the service at the different places on the scale. The figures are given as rated by the twenty-four persons who took the self-study. Some were not able to give a rating for certain reactions but filled in explanatory comments. Only the ratings are given here.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
(1)	6	10	3	5			
(2)	8	6	5	0	2	1	0
(3)	19	3					
(6)	8	5	3	3	1	1	0
(9)	6	7	6	0	0	1	0
(12)	8	8	2	1			
(15)	9	8	1				
(18)	17	4					

The service was held in a schoolroom with temporary altar. The priest in charge was a bishop, quite popular with the group, who was present in the room when the forms were being filled out. The group had appointed a committee to construct the form and took the self-analysis seriously, thinking of its possible use with persons with whom they would be working. All were accustomed to the service and none had taken such a test before. The self-study started some thinking and the comments revealed interesting problems. They are not discussed here, but some of the comments on another form will be used to illustrate how this instrument gives the kind of information that is much needed for revision of worship programs and for guidance in instruction on the character and possible values of worship.

This second form comprises quite another set of questions and was used in this case to study the meaning of a special musical service to a group of graduate students. The service was held in the University Disciples Church, Chicago, where

Dr. E. S. Ames is minister and Mr. F. B. Wise choir director. It was one of a carefully planned series, this one being called "An Interpretative Musical Service: Nature." It had three divisions or "Moods," "Awe, Repose, and Exultation," which were organized for a climactic effect. A well-trained male quartet contributed to the musical parts of the service. Doctor Ames gave a brief talk summarizing the theme of the day. Nine graduate students and three of their friends visited the service and recorded their reactions. The church is a liberal church located close to the University of Chicago and is attended in large part by university people and those of the community. Again only a part of the questions and of the reactions are given but they represent the kind of record that can be obtained, and the variation in the comments that are likely to be made.

Very Satisfactory Experience	**A**	**B**	**C**	**D**	**E**	**F**	**G**	**Very Unsatisfactory Experience**

Q. 1. Did I feel free from distractions and able to worship quietly and reverently?

Ratings: 3 4 4 1 0 0 0

Comments:

"Unusually free from distractions."

"Most of the audience came late. People left before the service was ended. An usher standing near me kept whispering to a friend."

"A slight distraction due to the fact that I was in a new place and did not know what to expect."

"General æsthetic effect was good. Created a feeling of reverence and made me want to worship."

Q. 3. Did God seem a definite reality affecting my life and the lives of others?

Ratings: 3 2 5 2 0 0 0

Comments:

"I always enjoy Doctor Ames because his concepts of God are near enough to mine to make appeal to me."

"God was just a word, lacking tangible content."

"God as a force back of and in nature was a reality affecting not only myself but all others. But as I watched others I wondered how many had experienced God, and if this was touching a responsive chord."

"In the last part of the service I lost any feeling of God's presence, but it was definitely apparent at first."

Q. 7. Did the service awaken in me any new values or purposes?

Ratings: 0 3 0 8 0 0 1

Comments:

"Nothing new for me."

"No. It made me lonesome for a few old ones."

"No. I enjoyed it, but there was no impulse to do something as a result."

"Not consciously, but it was of inestimable value to me."

Very Satisfactory Experience	**A**	**B**	**C**	**D**	**E**	**F**	**G**	**Very Unsatisfactory Experience**

Q. 8. Did the hymns permit me to express my faith and interest?

Ratings: 6 2 4 0 0 0 0

Comments:

"Well selected, but singing isn't one of my talents."

"I liked all the hymns."

"Not very familiar with them."

"Well selected. Gave opportunity for expression of the religious emotions desired in the service."

"One had associations and interest for me but the others were strangers and I only was interested in the music."

Q. 13. Did I feel the divine forces of life with which I can cooperate?

Ratings: 5 2 2 2 0 1 0

Comments:

"Emphasis of the entire service."

"The service lacked the final tie-up necessary to make this feeling significant."

"Very much. It was suggested in the music and readings very vividly."

"No. God was just a word without content."

Q. 17. Did the service as a whole do me good and make me glad I came?

Ratings: 5 4 3 0 0 0 0

Comments:

"Very restful but not very stimulating."
"Service was dignified and beautiful but not particularly worshipful."
"Very much so. I want to go again."
"I was glad to be there, and feel renewed in spirit by the experience."
"It was a good, comfortable concert for the benefit of the self-satisfied, would-be intelligentsia."

Q. 19. Did the organ music give me any worshipful feeling?

Ratings: 8 1 2 1 0 0 0

Comments:

"It was exquisite."
"The organ music helped to create feelings of awe, repose, and exultation."
"It was too much like the music in the movies."
"It was very inspiring."

Q. 23. Did the service put me in any more sympathetic relationship to any other person or persons?

Ratings: 1 2 1 5 1 1 1

Comments:

"It wasn't related to conduct in the least."
"One felt attuned to all the world."
"Nothing in the service about other persons."
"It was not social."
"Yes, though not outstandingly so."

Q. 26. Did I feel that the whole service was unified? or did it move from one unrelated item to another?

Ratings: 11 1 0 0 0 0 0

Comments:

"Perfect unification."
"It was the first really unified church service I ever attended."

Perhaps these few quotations will indicate the difference in reaction of persons with more or less liberal training. One person seems to be the exception, having distinctly conservative feelings about some of the factors in the service. Two questions are of special interest, Nos. 23 and 26. In Question 23 we have reactions expressed across the whole range of the scale. The service was an appreciation type of Nature meditation rather than a socially motivated one, and only indirectly would the social attitude be implied. One person seemed to catch the spirit that would tend to make him more sympathetic toward others as he says, "I felt attuned to all the world." Perhaps the group would not have been as critical on this point if they had not been asked to analyze the service and this factor was specified. The trend of the sentiment in the hymns and other special selections which were printed on the church calendar was to lift the soul above the world and to make him feel a new confidence in the powers above and around him. The problem remains of course as to whether some would call a service of worship complete without having the social attitude made more explicit. That is, some might say that a man cannot love God unless at the same time he love his brother also. Others would reply that it is quite possible and often advisable to give emphasis to one phase at a time to get a clear concept of what is desirable and then combine them on another occasion. Question 26 gets almost complete agreement. The printed program revealed the orderly progression. The organ music brought quite a strong response and suggests a factor that is sometimes taken for granted rather than intelligently directed. The two references to God in questions 3 and 13 illustrate the difficulty in assuming that all the worshipers have the same conception or attitude toward him and his way of working. Several felt that the service presented the idea of God which they assume as real and they were satisfied and even refreshed by the presentation. Another person did not get the conception with which he was familiar and says the use of the word God

was without content, a mere form. In order to discover the variety of ideas about God that a group may have the writer has prepared a check list of twenty-five definitions and it is interesting to see how different persons express themselves.

The foregoing study is as stated only a partial study of a worship experience. When joined with other investigations that can easily be made as to the concepts, practises, and preference of a group the leader should be able more intelligently to plan his worship instruction and the preparation of a service to meet the needs of whatever group he is dealing with. The writer has found that students who take this analytic practise in self-study are able to observe much more sympathetically the reactions of others. And the experience of thinking through the meaning and possibilities of worship usually stirs in a class a much deeper appreciation of it. Testimony to this effect has come from not only graduate students who tend to be more or less critical but also from persons who have not been accustomed to question their religious experiences. It has proved a wholesome and educational technique.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF ETHICS TO RECENT CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

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In his book, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Harald Höffding has written:

> Religion presupposes that men have discovered by experience that there is something valuable. Whatever a man may mean by religion, he must admit that it did not itself from the very beginning create. . . Since all religion presupposes the experience of values, religious values must themselves in a certain sense be derived, *i. e.*, conditioned, by interest in the primary values which our experience of life has taught us to know and to maintain. . .

In Höffding's phrase, the problem of this discussion is to ascertain how that primary value called the moral conditions those religious values which in recent years have been on the surface of the Christian religion. In a more general statement the problem is to disclose the influence which ethics have lately exerted upon the philosophy of the Christian religion.

In the first place, morality and ethics, particularly the latter, offer a sure foundation for religious experience and our philosophy of it. That ethics rather than morality are the principal aids to religion is due to their reflective character. In most instances we do not doubt the validity of our religious objects or observances until we have begun to think about them. No matter how plain our philosophy of religion may be, indeed, whether it be like that of the grave-digger or carpenter, we usually have no difficulty with our religion until we examine it reflectively. Up to the point of reflection we behave toward God as our fathers did before us. If they ate theological sour grapes, our teeth are set on edge. If they imbibed heresy, that is the draught in which we too most delight. To be sure, there are countless other factors in our religious experiences, but

none of them affects us consciously until we begin reflecting upon our religion. It is at this point that ethics help us, for ethics themselves are a process of reflection. In this thinking about our moral experience we find that basis for a reasonable outlook upon religion of which our thinking about our experiences with God discloses the need. To put the matter in a more specific way for the sake of illustration, we may say that for the young person who by dint of his own thinking has come to doubt his religion, ethics furnish a sure basis upon which he may rebuild both his faith in God and all of the human implications of that faith.

The ways in which this comes about are quite simple. First, thought about one's conduct discloses the disheartening fact that morality, in and by itself, is an empty shell. Alone, it is but a conch upon which some shadowy deity of the sea may regale himself by blowing into it his ghostly breath. The problems of moral reflection, if taken no further than reason in its usual sense can take them, lead us nowhere. The problem of the relation between individual and social good is an instance. What, for example, does a woman owe to herself? What, on the other hand, does she owe to society, as it is constituted in her family, her clubs, her church? Where can anyone exactly draw the distinguishing line between these classes of the good, and where, moreover, can one gain the principle by which to resolve the antithesis? Henry Sidgwick discovered that he could not do it without resorting to something other than reason, that is, belief. A. E. Taylor, too, thinks that this problem can never be solved by reason. There is the problem, too, of what constitutes the good. What, after all, is goodness or the good? Is it pleasure, happiness, furthering social health, doing the will of God? Or is it simply the good in itself? By themselves, ethics have not solved this problem. But they have pointed in this respect to the postulate of God.

Second, the wide gap between the moral ideal and moral accomplishment awaits closing. This is the yawning chasm

of which the sides are what we ought to do and what we do. Like the apostle Paul, the things we would not do, we do; while the things we would do, we do not do. Here we have a problem indeed. Is there no such thing as an ideal? If there is one, is it too high? If we have ideals, are our own natures utterly incapable of attaining them? Certainly our ordinary natures, with all of our appetites, passions, desires, and sentimentalities often seem very mean indeed when they are compared with such noble ideals of human conduct as are expressed by splendid souls like Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, Gamaliel, or the lowly Nazarene. If morality is not to reject such goals of human conduct and if it is not to make itself merely a department of a deterministic biology, this contradiction between moral idealism and moral actuality must be removed.

Here, then, is the key to the manner in which many of the problems of ethics constitute the foundation of religious reflection. These problems are insoluble by reason. While treatises have been written upon every one of them, there still seems to be more that can be said. Still they leave the minds of both learned and unlearned in puzzlement. And yet life must be lived on in spite of and in the face of all the haunting uncertainties of our thinking. Thus, out of the very difficulties in ethical thought comes the sheer necessity of a faith which transcends our intellectual turmoil and keeps us striving. This very necessity gives a powerful impetus to the Christian religion. Through the very shadows of ethical perplexity one is forced to an outlook upon life like the one Jesus maintained. His God and ours looms before us under the impetus of sheer moral necessity.

The classical argument of this sort in the history of modern philosophy is that formulated by Immanuel Kant. A more cautious argument which, however, follows the same general course was advanced by Henry Sidgwick. A very definite form of this kind of argument, clothed in the terms of the theory of value, has been proposed in the Gifford Lectures of

William Ritchie Sorley. It seems unnecessary at this place to trace these arguments in detail or to present any of the other processes of reasoning bearing upon this discussion that are to be found in the recent history of philosophy.

Without the rudiments of a theology, then, ethics somewhat resemble Matthias in Edwin Arlington Robinson's *Matthias at the Door*—they would be foolishly self-centered. Garth, the phantom of a deceased man who represents the true self of Matthias, addresses him severely:

> There is more of you for you to find, Matthias,
> Than science has found yet, or may find soon.

Thus might the essence of ethics, their true self, as it were, remark to moral science. For there is more of ethics to find " than science has found yet, or may find soon." This " more " is a philosophy of religion.

In the second place, a valuable contribution has been made to contemporary Christian thinking by the completeness which ethics have given to theology. There is a little church by the side of a highway the name of which is arresting: the " Full Gospel Church." In this phraseology it may be said that ethics have given to Christianity a full theology. Only a few of the numerous ways in which ethics have done this need concern us. One is the humanitarian stream which ethics have poured into theology particularly since the middle of the nineteenth century. As a result religion is sweeping into all the walks of life. As Kagawa remarked last winter at Pendle Hill, redemption is not only spiritual but also social, economic, and political. Since religion is the material of theology, this breadth of vision has appeared in theology. We have not so much a theology of the pew as a theology of the whole of human living. Consequently we find Alfred E. Garvie published about a year ago a book entitled *The Christian Ideal for Human Society,* containing chapters upon such subjects as the family, leisure and culture, industry, citizenship, education, and internationalism. The

tone and sweep of the book are contained in a single sentence: " Every human interest, activity, and relationship can be consecrated, if cleansed by God's Spirit from sin, selfishness, worldliness; and such an all-embracing consecration of human personality should be the goal of religious education." The gloomy Dean's *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems* exhibits the humanitarian stress. Dean Inge plunges fearlessly and scathingly into such intricate problems as the population question, humanitarianism, the position of women, divorce, suicide, and war. Of late, ethics have offered to theology problems of human well-being which theology must answer and in the answering of which theology has been herself wondrously enriched.

Moreover, a fresh and vigorous morality with its ethics keeps religion with its theology from a narrow fanaticism and from the mean selfishness into which the legitimately self-referred element of a full gospel is likely to degenerate. Robert Mackintosh in his *Values* gives this altruistic phase of religion fitting attention: " Personal salvation is not a selfish matter; for the Christ of the Gospels, or of St. Paul, dedicates to a life of love everyone in whose experience religion ceases to be a tradition, and becomes a reality ' full of grace and truth.' "

Ethics, again, have enlarged the concept of God. The God of metaphysics is a very shivery one indeed. Like the winds of the Antarctic he almost freezes the person who contemplates him. He is simply the bald idea, " deity." To this frigid and eerie God moral philosophy has brought rich, human warmth and comeliness of character. How could we have ever learned to think of God as Father, without the ethical implications in fatherliness? True it is that in moralizing our idea of God we may run the risk of anthropomorphism, the snare into which the primitive worshiper so disastrously fell. And yet it is quite doubtful whether we should not be better off with a conception of God that had a few anthropomorphic touches than we should be with the icy deity of a barren and arctic

metaphysic. However this may be, the effect of moral philosophy upon the idea of God is frequently encountered. It is remarkable that when in the shadowy religious sentiments John Stuart Mill entertained (in *Three Essays on Religion*), he met with the choice between divine omnipotence and divine goodness, he chose the latter. James Mark Baldwin, moreover, in his *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development,* wrote: "The obligation to do what he ought and to make others do what they ought is never absent from his sense of the divine being who is the embodiment of what ought to be done, and the source of its sanction."

Ethics, moreover, have something to offer theology in dealing with the problem of evil. While G. E. Moore does not apply his theory of organic unities to theology, he thereby does take account of unmixed goods. In his suggestion that the whole has properties quite different from the sum of its parts, may lie a hint that the goods of life, if added to and properly connected with its evils, constitute a whole that is altogether good. Another hint lies in the chapter "Absolute Ethics" of *Speculum Mentis,* written by R. G. Collingwood:

> With the disappearance of the last remnant of abstraction in the form of the distinction between the individual and society, the obstacle to the realization of perfect freedom is removed. The agent is now conscious of himself as absolute mind, and of every other agent, whether in agreement with himself or not, as coequal with himself. This means that he ceases to regard himself or his country as in the right and everybody else in the wrong, but he regards all actions as manifestations of a will which is always and necessarily rational even when "in the wrong," and therefore never wholly in the wrong.

Beyond this influence upon solving the problem of evil, ethics have made another enriching gift to theology. They have laid the foundation for the belief in immortality. The classic example in the later part of the story of philosophy is Immanuel Kant. Kant was unable to complete his moral philosophy without postulating immortality as well as freedom

and the existence of God. In view of the open conflict Kant found in human living between interest and duty, the pleasure-seeking of the senses and the virtue of the reason, he thought it necessary to postulate an infinite time of living in order to reconcile these two opposites. Hastings Rashdall, also, regards the belief in immortality to be even more serviceable to ethics than is belief in God.

Another contribution by way of enrichment made by moral philosophy to theology is the weight lent to the consciousness of sin. One may be sure that if the awareness of sin be part of the groundwork of a theology, that theology will have a more solid foundation in proportion to the degree in which it takes cognizance of ethics. For, ethics with their strong contrast between the ideal and the accomplishment, make very keen an awareness of sin. The continual falling short of the ideal on the part of even the most earnest strivers after truth and goodness breeds in us a deep and lasting consciousness of sin. For, however stately our moral efforts may be in their onward pushing, like solemn clouds that move across the evening sky, we find these efforts dwindling all too frequently into nothingness or into rampant and fickle acts very much as those same solemn clouds of the evening disappear before our watching eyes. Thus does the consciousness of sin receive deepening and widening from ethics.

In the third place, there is another major benefit which religious thought derives from moral theory. This is the assistance which ethics bring in bridging the so-called gap between science and religion. This chasm has been too frequently exaggerated. And yet the contrast between science and religion is tremendous. It often seems an antinomy of Kantian sharpness requiring even more than Hegelian power to resolve it, if indeed it ever can be resolved. In any event, ethics give us their support.

Science moves upon the plane of naturalism. It has a mechanistic outlook. It refuses to countenance anything which

does not now exist (using " exist " in the strict sense in which the scientist is likely to use it) or which cannot reasonably be expected, by a calculation of past and present reactions of matter, to exist in that same strict sense. It is true that disputation concerning physical processes is at present issuing in views which to the lay reader seem quite mystical. On the other hand, for the common run of us who must reconcile scientific thinking with our Christian view of the world, it seems that the bare sketch just given of the scientific outlook is sufficient for the present purpose. In any case, along come ethics with their assurance of the reality of things which in the strict, as it were, scientific sense, do not " exist " and which in all likelihood will never " exist." There is an " oughtness," they tell us, which is real. This " oughtness " has never been put into test-tubes nor has it ever been weighed in a balance. But it *is*. Just here is the bridge for our gap. In this " oughtness " which *is,* in those values which *are,* consists the bridge over which one must walk from the fields of science to the regions of religion. These realities of morality, moreover, the scientist must account for. Thus far he has not been able to treat them satisfactorily upon the basis of any of his naturalistic principles. He has had to lay them aside in the realms of value and belief. Once there, the scientist must leave his science and, turning philosopher, move on inevitably, it seems, to religious postulates. For a brief statement of this transition into a realm of reality which is more than natural, this account of G. E. Moore's will suffice, with the exception that the term " Metaphysical Ethics " appears for the term " ethics ": "A ' Metaphysical Ethics ' is marked by the fact that it makes the assertion: That which would be perfectly good is something which exists, but is not natural; that which has some characteristic possessed by a supersensible reality." Once arrived at this point, a thinker must go on, as we have already seen, to a rational belief in God.

No appreciation of the influence which ethics have had

upon theology would be at all penetrating which did not take account of a contribution that lies at the heart of Christian thinking. In their reflection Christians frequently become immersed in reconciling science with religion, in interpreting the inspiration of the Scriptures, and in other and lesser problems. But sooner or later believers are confronted with the inescapable Galilean. *He* must be accounted for. Some Christology or other the thoughtful Christian cannot avoid. And it is the peerless morality in the life of that humble Peasant, the deep insight and the wide sympathy of his ethical teaching, that are the most difficult to explain. He was so splendidly good that men very soon concluded that in him there was no wrong at all. His soul was immaculate. He was sinless. How is this to be explained? Is it all an illusion? Is it only the reaction of a few religious fanatics or merely the psychic aberration of a great many people otherwise mentally balanced? This is not likely, because the influence of the lowly Nazarene with all his sheer goodness has not only lingered but also grown in the minds of many reasonable people throughout the world. There still awaits interpretation by reason the tremendous fact so ably stated by H. H. Scullard: "Just at the moment when the world seemed least able to add to its stock of ethical ideas, but most anxious to preserve them from oblivion, there appeared in an obscure corner of the earth a Peasant who, in the opinion of those who thought themselves well qualified to judge, had never learned, who yet presented in his own character and teaching every virtue of every age and land in the purity, harmony, and unity of a perfect whole."

When one contemplates this sinless Being, and strives to plumb the depths of his moral philosophy and to appreciate the magnificence of his character, one is in the presence of an awesome mystery. Here, if anywhere in the whole range of Christian experience and particularly of Christian thinking one is brought face to face with the living Father: "... he that hath seen me hath seen the Father. . ."

HOW REAL IS THE RELIGIOUS OBJECT?

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A QUERY like this may take the form of a religious test, a philosophical speculation, or a check and counter-check procedure. If a man should sponsor a strictly religious quest, he rests his claim upon a dangerous basis of naïveté. For religion is reckless; it is the genius of man to embrace it passionately. And should one limit his inquiry to philosophy he would likewise be disappointed, for the reason that speculations are legion as are the wish-fulfilments of human nature. How real the religious object is is a concern that may be interrogated with confidence when man takes the risks inherent in experimental religion and at the same time is disciplined in his understanding by the principles of philosophy. The man of faith at times requires a dispassionate judgment; the critical student, on the other hand, must consider the immediate findings of religious experience in the qualifications of his postulates and claims. Religious value and detached fact of religious experience are correlative terms that need to be explained rather than identified.

Some men are devout religionists, and independently make claims for religious truth. Are there not too many, for the sign-posts indicative of the truth of religion and those of their "truth" have insufficient criteria in common? In the name of the "real" God, why so many divergent theisms? The unrelatedness of such men's practical and critical interests renders their rational claims of secondary significance for the student of religion. Is it not possible for an individual to participate in creative religion, to question critically the nature of religion, and to associate his findings and questionings with a view to arriving at the meaning of religious phenomena? Fifteen well-known American scholars have thought so, and, in the

volume *Religious Realism* [1] have set forth their positions both in reference to method and content of theistic faith.

Douglas Clyde Macintosh has edited the essays. Except for Bixler's contribution interpreting Scheler, Calhoun's interpreting Plato, and Niebuhr's survey of problems in religious realism, the writers addressed themselves personally to some phase of the general theme. The editor has used one-fifth of the text to develop with dialectical skill his views of empiricism, epistemology and metaphysics. It is unfortunate that one of the most indigenous theological positions to America, that of the socio-historical view-point of Shailer Mathews, has been omitted from the symposium. The reference to this omission in the preface does not compensate for the distinct loss in text-value. It is regrettable that such an highly important volume of essays has been released from the bindery without an index-guide to subjects and proper names.

I

Religious Realism presents a reaction from the successive claims of philosophical idealism, naturalistic scepticism and current humanism. Immanuel Kant was responsible for inaugurating a period of subjectivism in human thought that remained dominant in idealistic thinking for over a century. With the rise of the social sciences, chiefly history and psychology, and their application to the problems of religion, anthropocentric studies reinforced the primacy of the knower in philosophy and magnified illusory attitudes toward the objective factor in religious experience. As the view-point of the natural and biological sciences imbued man with a sense of his sufficiency to control the forces of this world for social purposes, the hypothesis of God lost focus in his thinking. Today a counter trend has set in. Repeatedly, throughout the text under consideration, the writers discredit these implications of subjectivism and address themselves to the extra-

[1] Published by Macmillan, 1931, pp. viii, 502.

human factors in religious empiricism. In some important respects their forerunner in America was William James.

The religious realist reaffirms the metaphysical identity of the religious object, God. A fresh interest in theism has become manifest in Europe and America in the light of the disillusioning experiences following the World War. In Germany such philosophers as Heim and Husserl and such theologians as Barth and Brunner point the emphasis; while in America Macintosh, Wieman, Horton and others reflect the same view-point. These men, without blinking the philosophical claims of science or underrating the potency of man in this technological age, defend the immediacy and the essentiality of God in human experience. In Niebuhr's essay he distinguishes five factors in religious realism: "the independence of the (divine) object; the subordination of mind to this independent reality; the fresh approach to values; the critical apprehension of the problem of evil; and the rejection of a monistic assumption in metaphysics."

With this base line it is instructive to contrast the realistic schools of Germany and America. In Barthian theology the pessimistic social attitude and the dualistic world-view entertained are unacceptable to Americans. In the philosophy of *Phänomenologie* the extreme a priori postulates taken for granted are not in harmony with the precepts of pragmatism. Perhaps legitimately the American could claim Husserl and Scheler approximate more closely the idealistic than the realistic schema of thought. Conversely, German scholars are raising certain questions concerning what they consider are superficialities in the American realists' position. Americans have dissociated their view-point neither from the alleged fallacies of psychologism nor from the entanglements of utilitarianism. They are accused also of ignoring tragic cosmic conditions that lend urgency to the consideration of the problem of evil. Doubtless both parties are in a position to enrich their attitudes by regarding each other's criticisms.

Realism is empirical in procedure. What are the principles of empiricism? The reader of the text had not advanced through many essays until any idea of methodological harmony among the contributors was dispelled from his mind. The writers agree somewhat upon two grounds: one, that the empiricist in religion approaches his inquiry using the religious object strictly as a working hypothesis, the affirmation or denial of which requires authentication in sufficient tests of religious experience; the other, that man tests the validity of that postulate by participating in a specific type of personal interaction (characterized as "religious") with his most inclusive environment (social and cosmic). And yet even these statements require qualification. Whereas Wieman avidly affirms the reality of God, Wright holds to "a balance of probability in favor of" his functional existence. The former's attitude is pronouncedly religious in stress, and the latter's coolly philosophical in tentativeness. As for the locus of interaction in religion, Pratt and Macintosh find it on the "spiritual" (or "supernatural") rather than the "physical" (or "natural") level of experience; on the contrary, Wright and Boodin discover it in a fit appreciation of the "nisus" principle of emergent evolution, as described by Lloyd Morgan.

No stage in validating procedure is more difficult to make convincing than the writers' treatment of immediacy in religious experience. Several men select the conventional term "intuition" to describe the presumed meeting of man and the religious object; but there are nearly as many contexts to the symbol as there are men who use it. Bixler argues for intuition of pure essences in approach to all reality; Widgery defends "moral intuition" as "this or that quality of feeling" apprehended "as intrinsically good or bad" and absolutely authoritative, which feeling is akin to that in religious immediacies. Macintosh accepts rather axiomatically the principle that an "empirical intuition . . . is as universal as human consciousness itself," but is inclined somehow to make apprehen-

sion, intuition and perception synonymous terms. Lyman, expressly indebted to James and Bergson, reasons on philosophical rather than religious grounds that intuitions actually provide man with divine truth. This truth, he thinks, has been revealed in the high peaks of historic Christianity. Boodin concludes that " the Christian intuition has been sound, but its theology has been intellectualistic and barren."

In the matter of sanctions an equally wide range of viewpoints prevails. Pratt accepts " the trustworthiness of introspection " and " the inherent probability of (human) personality " as bases for faith in the self and God. Macintosh rather arbitrarily selects and rests his case upon (1) " the right specifically religious adjustment," in (2) " religious experience at its best." Describing a plurality of significant values among world religions including Christianity, Widgery passes uncritically to define certain allegedly common " ultimates," which attributes deity is supposed to possess. Hartshorne and Coe seek romance in religious expression, while Horton begs for security. He believes that in liberal circles the time is ripe for theologians to provide " an authoritative body of religious teaching . . . to keep the inexperienced from floundering," and he undertakes to draft in blue-print the foundations, cornerstones, superstructures, turrets and battlements that should characterize such a system. It is doubtful if Horton can maintain a pragmatic distinction between the psychological sanction of his view-point and that of Roman Catholicism. In striking antithesis is the attitude of Wieman. He repudiates the adequacy of any language or theology to represent the summum bonum; the most rewarding religion eventuates in " devotion to the unknown."

II

But what of the essayists' conception of the religious object? Space forbids more than a sampled roll-call of contributors. Rogers in a finely tempered discussion defends the

prerogative of intelligent men to entertain "the religious hypothesis" despite the strongest contentions of astrophysicists. There is much of the same purpose in Wright's and Boodin's essays, although they do not allow themselves to take as seriously the arguments naturalists bring against theism. These men desire the perpetuation of religious faith, but reveal little interest in theological themes. Whether Montague is more concerned to lend support to the doctrine of the Christian trinity or to project a trinitarian pattern of cosmic reality, is difficult to say; he calls his article "a speculation." Hartshorne and Wieman affirm the presence of "divine strategy" in the contingent universe, the former conceiving of God in terms of a functional "condition," and the latter a special "structure" of the cosmic process. Coe in two passing references points to a fatalistic tendency in the universe, "the more-than-us that has us in its power."

The doctrine of divine immanence receives priority throughout the book. Avoiding pantheism, at least two of the authors conceive of the religious object in terms of the "spiritual" phase of reality, certain others in terms of the integrated value-structure of the universe. For the former, deity is believed to occupy the physical world much as man dwells in a corporal body; for the latter, disintegrating forces of the cosmos are recognized as openly hostile to God. That God is superhuman all writers attest, but that he transcends the cosmic order which science investigates, Wieman[2] and Wright deny while Macintosh and Widgery affirm. Macintosh claims that deity is personal; Wright assumes it; while Wieman and Hartshorne point to an a-personal object. Although Wright and Boodin in common take their theistic departure from Lloyd Morgan's "plain tale" of emergent evolution, the former postulates that God may learn from experience, change his mind from time to time, and is therefore finite in power; the latter,

[2] It should be noted, however, that Wieman makes provision for potential values of supreme worth that may become real, which values as possibility only inhere in the cosmic process.

on the contrary, holds to the doctrine of divine perfection. In a few scattered references in the text the religious object is associated with the power of love in the universe.

Because Macintosh has developed his theistic position in fullest detail, the writer selects his view-point for one or two observations. Do not certain fundamental phrases that the author repeats frequently tend to become for him abstractions of a definitive logic? Take, for example, the following terms, "dependably successful experimental religion," "a certain right specifically religious adjustment," "spiritual religious experience." On one page he uses "purely qualitatively" the term "spiritual" eleven times and on the following page "divine" fifteen times. This qualifying of qualitatives for the purpose of particularizing terms suggests a failing strength in language to carry conviction. Moreover, what would constitute the absolute norm of "religious experience at its best," and who is responsible for passing upon the superiority of its content? Macintosh sponsors an "essence" approach to theistic faith that permits the defense of ultimate attributes associated historically with the Christian deity. In the words of Rogers, who rejects such a dialectical method, it may be claimed that "certainly the empiricist has no right to this procedure." Seeking to provide for both the "spiritual" transcendence and immanence of God, Macintosh attempts to steer between the Scylla of Wieman's behavioristic theism and the Charybdis of the Boston school of personalism.

Indices of liberal theological thought are plentiful in these essays. Yet, it is astonishing to note how much Christian orthodoxy still takes precedence in so-called religious realism. One might conclude from reading Lyman and Macintosh that twentieth-century evangelical religion enlisted absolute truth with reference to the spiritual riddle of the universe. Whatever would a pioneer for realism do with "a body of (theological) affirmations proved and tested, confirmed by all competent authorities, and to be disregarded at one's peril," which

is the desire of Horton? The omission of the problem of evil by the majority of the writers hints of traditional moral optimism in philosophical circles. This book is amazingly silent in reference to the religious problems incident to a high-power industrial, internationally-confused and pagan civilization. Every essayist felt it morally incumbent upon him to come to terms with the principles of the natural and biological sciences; few exercised any regard in weighing the challenge of the social sciences and in bringing the ethical conditions of living men into the perspective of religious realism. Why continue to segregate falsely human and cosmic processes, to make the former an insignificant incident in the vortex of the latter, and consequently to divorce metaphysics from morality in the philosophy of religion?

III

After a study of *Religious Realism* the inquirer will probably foster four questions of paramount importance: What constitutes a realistic theory of value? How significant is the problem of evil for religion? In what respect is science a menace to faith? And, how closely akin are psychology and theology in one's philosophy of religion? That these questions overlap is self-evident. However, if they are made sounding-boards for the essayists' view-points some interesting echoes are discovered.

In the introductory essay Rogers voices a basic principle when he says that " there is no short and easy way to reconcile the universe of science with the claims of human good, or to see just *how* values are to be conceived as entering into combination with its impersonal laws and forces." What is the matrix of social values? Is it the appreciating mind of the individual, an intrinsic factor of objects themselves, or a quality of experience due to subject-object interaction? Wright answers categorically that values do not exist apart from persons, while Macintosh and Wieman aver that they may and do.

Horton selects a mediating position to the effect that values are not "purely relative" to man's appetites; they depend upon human taste but "even more significantly" upon real phenomena in the structure of the world. Not content with one category of value, Macintosh postulates a "sufficiently broad and elastic" definition to allow for "instrumental, terminal and fundamental" types. Perhaps no problem which the writers raise is more difficult to treat satisfactorily. Does not the logic of the realist's position force him to face a paradox?[3] God, for the realist, is an object of inquiry. If this object could be investigated scientifically, the so-called value aspect of deity would remain solely factual criteria of evidence. But, God must be sought religiously (by means of a participating fellowship) and hence under circumstances in which the individual projects his loyalty into the situation to contribute a subjective aspect of value to the shared experience. How can these two phases of value be adequately appraised? If, as Horton thinks, there is a "real distinction, grounded in the nature of things, between what is valued and what is valuable," however are they related in experience without each losing its individuality for the inquirer? Must there ever remain a necessary cleavage between rational and religious assurance in theology?

Niebuhr selected "the critical apprehension of the problem of evil" as one of the five major concerns in religious realism. Facing this barrier to any easy-going idealistic view-point, realists might be expected to cultivate a melioristic attitude toward the subject. As a matter of fact, the majority of the essayists display demonstrative signs of optimism. Only a few writers mention the subject of cosmic evil. Hartshorne secularizes the issue by referring to the problem as involving "the fortunes and accidents of circumstance . . . the law of chance" in man's relation to the universe, and in the moral challenge involved he unintentionally "takes sides" by referring

[3] Wieman suggests it in his first sentence when he writes, "Love uses glowing words; but accurate thinking demands cold, abstract terms."

to this type of world as " impartial " to man's well-being. Coe, Wright, and Calhoun (representing Platonism) support a social theory of the genesis of evil. Man is responsible for the phenomenon. Is there a latent Roycean influence working in Coe when he attempts to justify ethically cosmic sufferings imposed upon man in the course of pursuing his mundane lot? Macintosh favors a religious faith of healthy-mindedness and dismisses the subject in question with a footnote reference. Boodin considers that " the principle of cosmic laziness is a sufficient explanation for the refractoriness of nature," whereas Wright denies that there is any " principle of evil in nature." Only Wieman " pays the devil his due." He witnesses to " the terrible magnitude of evil " in the structure of cosmic reality, and to its sheer opposition to God. But he does not develop the theoretical implications of this phase of man's cosmic awareness as he does those of the structure of positive value. There are not more than a half-dozen pages of scattered references to the problem of evil in the whole manual.

It would be misleading to underestimate the continued difficulties that pertain between the claims of science and of religion. The source of chief difficulty is scarcely an empirical philosophy versus a theological position, but rather the deeper question of comparative methodologies. What procedure of cosmic fellowship can a religious man practise who desires to live by the light of science? Several of the essayists are more concerned about substantiating a deposit of religious belief than in clarifying a spiritual manner of world-venture, and for that reason they shed little light on this fundamental issue. Montague does confess that " most of those calling themselves liberals today find it sufficiently difficult to believe in the vaguest theistic ground for the universe." This type of frankness might be confessed more freely as far as it represents the situation. Will not empirically-minded men lend limited approval to those (e. g., Pratt and Macintosh) who bifurcate reality to allow for " physical (natural)" and " spiritual (supernatu-

ral)" levels, thus permitting religion to run to cover from the claims of science by taking refuge in a cave of Adullam? The influence of inherited Christianity appears to have priority here over the principles of religious realism. The *method of hypothesis,* adopted in matter-of-fact fashion by the scientist, requires more thoroughgoing treatment as a basis for experimental logic in religion.

Is it not a common trait of human nature in theological disquisition for the writer's psychological motive to creep in unconsciously and gain rating under the badge of philosophical method? Rogers writes "of man's inveterate disposition to standardize the human race after a pattern determined by his own emotional range." [4] In *The Mind in the Making,* James Harvey Robinson has reminded us that most men have "good" as well as "real" reasons for affirming or denying beliefs. That there are personal tastes illustrated in these essays is clearly evident. One example in contrast will suffice for the present purpose. On the one hand the instinctive desire for religious security gains precedence time and again in these printed pages; on the other, the wish for absolutely unfettered religious experimentation is pressed. Witness the Horton and Wieman temperaments as they break through the logic of their language. The former disclaims "the acute attack of religious uncertainty" that menaces liberal Christianity and asks for "reasonable certitude" and "accredited truth" in order to rectify the depleted cause of religion in America. The latter spurns theological or religious anchorage, maintaining with "zest and joy" that "devotion to the unknown, the unattained and the unimagined is the very breath of life to science" and none the less to religion. May not Wieman's sharp criticism of man's construed knowledge of the universe and the religious object also reveal this emotive factor in his position? The per-

[4] Cf. F. C. S. Schiller's comment in *Problems of Belief,* p. 172: "The more we probe into the actual use to which philosophic principles are put, and study the psychological idiosyncracies of their advocates, the clearer it becomes that their 'rationality' is always an (ethical) value-judgment, relative and reducible to their consonance with the aims and purposes of their makers."

sonal equation has an advantage in that it contributes individuality to a writer's position, but it also deflects his aims in clarifying the principles of realism.

IV

Two types of readers may turn to this noteworthy volume of essays for guidance. Those who seek a single-minded confirmation of the theistic hypothesis will find a medley of confessions and turn away to more harmonious sources of authority. Julian Huxley in his recent book, *What Dare I Think?*, does not represent them when he says that for the present there " must be a reverent agnosticism concerning ultimates . . . the truly religious man must be content not to know many things." A greater value than ultimate philosophic truth illumines the text under review. Its pages reflect a fellowship of minds loyal to a scientific principle of inquiry. Those who seek religious realism in philosophy will welcome the text. Not only are scholars objectifying religious experience for the purpose of understanding its phenomena more critically, but they are attempting to objectify the objective factor in religious experience for the same end. There is a serious search for the religious object and a refining of empirical method with a view to increasing validity in the search. The trend in this book signalizes an approaching theological maturity in an age of science. And in Boodin's words, " If this (view-point) seems unsatisfactory to the rational consciousness, we may learn modesty from the procedure of science."

THE COUNTRY CHURCH AND THE IMMIGRANT

EDWIN E. SUNDT

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CONSIDERABLE written material is available concerning the foreigner in urban centers, but very little relative to the immigrant in rural areas. The foreigner in our cities has been the object of praise and condemnation. He is said to be responsible for crime, racketeering, lawlessness and gambling, and also to have made a fair contribution to science, art, athletics, business and religion. All of which may be partly true.

But what of the new citizen in the country districts? How is he faring in agricultural surroundings and how does his failure or success compare with that of the native-born? What is the church doing to meet the foreign-language group in the midst of American rural communities? These are questions which I shall seek to answer. They concern, it seems to me, not alone the country pastor and social worker, but are of importance to all thoughtful Christians everywhere.

I. HERE THEY ARE!

Consider the conquest of rural areas by the foreign-born. This "conquest," as Daniel C. Brewer points out, has been silent, effective, and carries with it far-reaching social, moral, and cultural implications to our American civilization.

The total farm population in the United States in 1920 was 31,614,269. Of these nearly four millions were of mixed parentage and one million and a half of foreign birth. Approximately one-tenth of all farm operators in our country are of foreign birth.

New England, once the paradise of Yankeedom, has been completely transformed by the foreigner. The recent census reveals the astounding fact that out of approximately seven

million people no less than five million are listed as either foreign-born or children of non-native parents! They occupy hundreds of farms in New England in addition to furnishing the labor group in industrial centers.

Connecticut provides some startling examples of this conquest. Lebanon is located in the heart of one of the oldest farming districts in the State. Names well honored in American traditions reaching back to the seventeenth century are associated with its history. Beautiful colonial homes still adorn the highways and byways. But lo! out of 181 farms 97 are operated by foreign-born citizens. Nearly half of these are of Russian birth. Nearby are Hebron and Colchester. Both are predominantly settled by Jewish, Russian and Polish farmers. Willington, one of the loveliest rural townships in Connecticut, was within the memory of many living residents wholly American; it now reports the presence of thirteen nationalities, mostly of Czechoslovakian, Polish, Italian, Irish and English birth. Four out of seven rural district schools have not one child of native-born parents. The majority of the Yankee families are childless. Brooklyn, Connecticut, has a large Finnish colony, while other sections are occupied by Italian, Jewish, Hungarian and Scandinavian farmers. All told Connecticut reports 65 per cent. foreign stock! This is a fair picture of rural Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and certain areas in New Hampshire and Maine.[1]

The great central Northwest is overwhelmingly foreign. Wisconsin and Minnesota have large German, Finnish and Scandinavian settlements. North Dakota reported in 1920 that 46.6 per cent. of all its farms were operated by the foreign-born. In a survey of western portions of the State 56.5 per cent. of all settlers were recent immigrants with Germans, Norwegians, Russians and Swedes in the majority.[2]

[1] Brewer, Daniel Chauncey, *The Conquest of New England by the Immigrant;* G. P. Putnam's Sons; 1926.

[2] *Surveys of Social and Religious Agencies in North Dakota,* by North Dakota State College, Grand Forks, North Dakota.

The number of foreign-language churches reveals conditions. Thus out of 2,272 churches in North Dakota all but six hundred are conducting services primarily for immigrant groups. In Minnesota there are more Scandinavian Baptist churches which use the Swedish, Danish or Norwegian language than English-speaking Baptist congregations. In North Dakota we have a larger number of German Baptist churches than American, and so forth. Illinois, Indiana, Iowa and South Dakota have extensive foreign settlements.

On the west coast the Oriental problem is primarily an economic one, centering in land ownership. The northwest coast is thickly populated by immigrants, and the great lumber-camps and fishing canneries are almost exclusively manned by them, principally of Scandinavian stock. In Texas and Georgia are large Bohemian settlements. Southern Indiana is the home of German and Swiss immigrants whose farms, homes and churches are exceptionally prosperous. New Jersey and New York have attracted truck-farmers of southern European birth.

Curiously enough, the west coast, north of San Francisco, owes much to Russian immigrants. They came, via Bering Sea and Alaska, as early as 1750, a century before California became a part of the United States. These Russians were principally herdsmen and laid the foundations for later and more prosperous agricultural progress in that region. By 1871 no less than 81,000 Russians arrived in eastern ports. Many of these treked westward and located in the Dakotas. The 1920 census records the presence of 713,000 foreign-born Russians in the United States.

Edmund de S. Brunner, writing about the distribution of immigrant farmers, states that:

> All the largest nationality groups are from northern Europe. At the head of these nationality groups come the Germans with 140,667 foreign-born operators in 1920. . . The next largest groups, in 1920, were the Swedes and Norwegians, with 60,461 and 51,599 farm operators respec-

tively . . . South Carolina has the fewest (foreign-born farmers) . . . and Minnesota, with 155,846, has most. The four states next in order after Minnesota are: Wisconsin, 129,728; Texas, 114,507; Michigan, 112,358; and California, 94,910. Over 41 per cent. of all the foreign-born farm population of the country is to be found in these five states.[3]

Enough has been cited to show that the presence of the foreign-born constitutes an important factor in the religious, social, and economic realm within rural America.

II. Is the Immigrant Making Good?

Many would reply to this question without an adequate knowledge of facts. The person who would say that these foreigners are the cause of most of our problems, that they live cheaply, labor long hours, are tenaciously clannish, frequently illiterate, usually inferior farmers, and anti-American, needs to examine specific data before making such sweeping assertions. Likewise, caution is needful in the use of praise.

Happily the Institute of Social and Religious Research has sought to provide a factual basis for our judgment of immigrant farmers. These facts are available to every student of rural life. It is upon these studies and my own extensive opportunity to observe the foreigner in action that the following facts are presented. Many of the figures are quoted from Edmund de S. Brunner's thorough consideration of "Immigrant Farmers and Their Children," published by the Institute of Social and Religious Research.[4]

Anyone familiar with agricultural conditions, in rural communities where the natives have gradually surrendered their farms to immigrant groups will affirm that frequently the foreigner occupies the poorest soil and most "run-down" farms. Brunner reaches this conclusion. The reason for this is chiefly economic. The immigrant is limited in financial resources. After years of labor in industrial centers he has

[3] Brunner, Edmund de S., *Immigrant Farmers and Their Children;* Doubleday, Doran & Co.: 1929. Published by the Institute of Social and Religious Research.

[4] Institute of Social and Religious Research, 230 Park Avenue, New York City.

succeeded in accumulating a small fund which enables him to return to the land whence he actually came. But his limited capital necessitates the purchase of small and often neglected farms.

I recall exactly this process in several New England communities. When the foreigner arrived upon the farm the soil was barren, buildings shamefully decadent, and prospects decidedly discouraging. Nevertheless, here is where the immigrant resolved to restore life and establish security for himself and family. A few years pass. The fields present a new and cheerful view; barns have been repaired; the house has been improved; shrubbery and flowers, trees and gardens have been planted—the old farm has been reborn. There is life, children and cheerfulness about it. I know of entire rural townships where the foreigner has actually been the means of saving the community from economic defeat. Industriously, with a spirit akin to that of the early pioneers (themselves immigrants), by prudent living and ceaseless labor he has gradually won for himself and his family a reasonable independence. Is this the process taking place upon hundreds of farms where the foreigner has gained possession? Brunner answers this question, after exhaustive surveys, with an emphatic "yes." It is especially true in the older sections of the country.

Consider farm ownership. Of nearly five million native-born farmers only 66 per cent. own their farms. Of 600,000 foreign-born operators 90 per cent. have become owners! The immigrant clearly demonstrates his ability to rise above tenancy, though he begins his career severely handicapped. The Finns, Poles and Canadians lead in this respect.

It is significant, too, that the comparatively small group of immigrant farmers own land and buildings estimated to be worth nine billion dollars, or exactly one-seventh of all the farm property in the United States. This foreign group, according to Brunner, constitutes one-tenth of the total num-

ber of farmers. The average value of farms owned by immigrants is much higher than that owned by the natives, this being $13,484 for the former group and $10,019 for the latter. Here the German, Danish and Scotch farm owners excel other nationalities. Their farms have a value of over $16,000 each. A questionnaire to county agents brought the reply that they noted a ". . . tendency, in all regions, for the foreign-born to cultivate their land far more intensively than the native-born."

The charge is often made that the foreign farmer does not send his children to school. The revelation of public school records therefore is of interest. These show that natives send 90.6 per cent. of their children to public school while the immigrant contributes 91.7 per cent. The actual attendance records indicate as high an attendance average for immigrant children as for natives, the difference being very slight. Similarly there is only a negligible difference in intelligence tests applied to native and immigrant children. The following table suggests the similarity in ability and defectiveness:

PARENTS	CASES	RETARDED CHILDREN	NORMAL	ADVANCED
Native	1,724	27.4%	63.3%	9.2%
Foreign	839	26.8%	62.9%	10.3%

Doctor Brunner comes to the following conviction:

> The unavoidable conclusion is that . . . the child of the foreigner, regardless of the country of origin of his parents, makes practically as good a record as the native-stock child in rural schools.

Again many people suppose that among immigrant groups there prevails a high rate of illiteracy. The charge is directed especially against Jewish, Russian, Italian and Polish nationals. Nothing could be further from actual facts.

Gabriel Davidson, who represents the Jewish Agricultural Society, gives the following tell-tale data, gathered from repre-

sentative cross sections of Jewish farmers. Within the group surveyed (a total of 266 farmers) 65 per cent. are men under fifty years of age. Less than 10 per cent. are over sixty. Eighty-nine per cent. can read English, and no less than 86 per cent. are American citizens. Moreover, they are a stable group, over 75 per cent. having been on the present farm over five years. Ninety-seven expressed their intention to remain. Of the 545 children over sixteen in these families (note the high percentage of children per adult questioned) 146 had had only public school preparation, 312 high school, and no less than eighty-seven a college education. The prosperity of this fine group is further indicated by the fact that 76 per cent. have telephones, 82 per cent. radios, and 78 per cent. automobiles.[5] Few American-born farm groups could equal this splendid showing.

Doctor Brunner also furnishes elaborate charts relative to the comparative intelligence of immigrant children of southern European stock—principally Italian—and that of the children of the native-born. It is clear from these studies and comparisons that Italian children in rural New Jersey and elsewhere are certainly not markedly inferior. Where a slight difference occurs, favoring the native child, it is likely that home conditions, language difficulties and other factors account for it. There is no basis whatever for the general assumption that children with south-European parents are decidedly inferior to the children of Nordic blood. An examination of Doctor Brunner's study will affirm this.

Whoever has spent some time in the rural sections of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota has been impressed with the uniformly clean, attractive and well-cared-for homes wherever Germans and Scandinavians have settled. In many high schools through this section the children of foreign-born parents predominate in numbers and scholarship. They fill with honor places on athletic and debating teams, and in music

[5] Davidson, Gabriel, "A View of Jewish Farm Life," *Rural America*, October, 1932, issue.

and civic clubs. Their names head honor lists in public schools, high schools and colleges. Already children of the first generation are taking their places in politics, professions, preaching, art, and commerce, and doing so with distinction. The writer knows communities which have been saved from inevitable decay, physically, intellectually, and morally, by the influx of fresh pioneer stock from Europe. Even a superficial acquaintance with the names of artists, athletes, and celebrated scientists and men of learning will confirm the statement that the immigrant groups in rural (and urban) areas have brought to America a rich heritage, splendid cultural contributions and potential abilities.

III. The Country Church and the Foreign-Born

According to the foregoing we have in the United States a large number of immigrants who live in rural communities. They are progressive, intelligent and successful. Their children are an honor to rural society. Economically and politically they play an important part. Educationally they rate favorably with the natives. In religious matters, however, the story is not so satisfactory.

Briefly, there have been and remain, religiously, three distinct approaches to the immigrant in rural sections:

1. that of the Roman Catholic church, which includes scattered foreign-language churches in Michigan, New England, Indiana, Wisconsin and Illinois;

2. that of the foreign-language Protestant churches, found principally in New England, the Central Northwest, and isolated Lutheran and Evangelical churches in the Central States;

3. that of English-speaking Protestant churches widely separated over the entire country.

In group one are such splendid rural churches as those directed by Father George Nell, at Effingham, Illinois; Sunderland, Wisconsin; Posen, Michigan; and others. The

principal difficulty here lies in the fact that the Roman Catholic church has only a few such efficient organizations. The majority of Roman Catholic farmers attend no services whatever. There are rural sections in New England where hundreds of Catholic families live without any continuous contact with the church of their faith. Similar examples are readily supplied from other parts of the country.

The most effective work among immigrant groups has, thus far, been rendered by the foreign-language churches listed under group two. All through Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa and the Dakotas, these foreign-language rural churches have contributed invaluable service. Here the Lutheran, Evangelical, Baptist, Reformed and other denominations have labored with distinction. One cannot speak too highly of this service to men and women who enjoy and prefer to hear the gospel in their own tongue. A visit to Wisconsin or Minnesota will readily affirm the value of these organizations.

But a new day is dawning. Indeed, it has already arrived.[6] Immigration has practically ceased to be a contributing factor in the expansion of these churches. A large Minnesota church which formerly, prior to the War, received as many as fifty families annually from direct immigration sources, reports that during the past three years only three families have arrived in the community. It is obvious, therefore, that if the foreign-language churches are to survive they must depend upon the loyalty of the past and present generation and upon the devotion of their descendants. True enough, through the Central Northwest and in isolated sections in Iowa, Indiana and Illinois one can locate entire communities which have preserved in a remarkable degree their racial origin, language and church. Clark's Grove, Minnesota, and Westphalia, Indiana, are good illustrations. But with irresis-

[6] Sundt, Edwin E., *The Country Church and Our Generation;* Fleming H. Revell Company; 1932.

tible force the gradual "Americanization" of people and customs is creating a new problem which the foreign-language churches cannot meet. For on the one hand is a tenacious devotion to racial and language heritages, while on the other is the perplexing problem introduced by English-speaking sons and daughters who do not sense their allegiance to anything but things "American."

Then too these churches have had a very limited approach. There are fine exceptions to this, of course. I am familiar with churches in southern Indiana, Minnesota and North Dakota which, though persisting in a foreign-language approach, have cultivated a fine social program. These churches are also maintaining their own far better than churches where the approach has been purely through a Sunday preaching service.

The younger generation in particular demands that the church of their fathers become actively engaged in the promotion of community welfare, social programs, etc., and insists upon a revision in language. This demand has created considerable conflict and trial. In many cases the various denominational supervisors have sided with the older immigrants, believing the church could best be conserved by a foreign-language approach. Where this is persistently maintained there is a gradual decline in attendance of young people. It is a case of "losing" by "saving" oneself.

My judgment is that for several years to come there will be need of maintaining foreign-language church services for the benefit of the mature members. Many of these cannot understand an English sermon. Hymns are unfamiliar. Happy associations and years of Christian experience are not readily forgotten.

But it is equally important to recognize that a foreign language approach has become obsolete. It spells sure extinction. Hundreds of churches are accordingly ministering through a bi-lingual program. A review of the past few years

proves, however, that the English language is gradually displacing even this approach. This in turn should mean something to young men interested in preparing for the ministry to immigrant groups, it also implies that a change is essential in the program designed to prepare such future leaders. What this approach should be, and what type of education is most desirable in view of all this, I am not as yet prepared to state.

It is important to notice that the number of people reached through the churches represented in groups one and two constitutes a minority of the total immigrant groups in rural America. There are no actual figures available. But if my observation is accurate, and based upon facts visible to one whose business it is to view matters impartially, I believe it would be fair to estimate that in New England less than five per cent. of the foreign rural population attend any church; that in the Central Northwest this percentage is considerably higher, due to the numerous foreign-language churches; and that all in all not over fifteen per cent. of our immigrants are connected with the Christian church.

The record of English-speaking Protestant churches in rural communities where the foreigner lives is one of the tragedies of American Christianity. In New England, where scores of communities are populated by the foreign-born, not two churches out of one hundred attempt to serve the immigrant. The native church moves on (usually backward) with complacent indifference and a smug assurance that God will somehow make all things well.

Throughout the Central West, and the far West where smaller foreign settlements are located, the American church exhibits the same type of unconcern. Only the fewness of immigrants saves it from embarrassment. These minority groups constitute the " forgotten men and women " in rural life. It seems that we readily accept them into secular organizations, solicit their trade and welcome their children into our

schools. The church, which preaches the brotherhood of man, for some unaccountable reason finds it possible to minister to the foreigner in his native land and to leave him untouched in its own back yard. Rapidly, however, the real missionary problem within America will center in the immigrant who is now our neighbor. There is justification for the charge, made by the *Russkoye Slovo,* a New York Russian newspaper, that "America is not at all interested in the soul and spiritual life of the immigrant."

Into this indifference enters, of course, race prejudice, a purely materialistic evaluation of the immigrant's worth, shallow religious concepts and a strange underestimate of the foreigner's needs, interests, natural abilities and aspirations. The Christian church in rural areas and the immigrant are, at this writing, truly foreign to each other. The irony of it all is that the very institution which proclaims the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, and the incarnation of love as essential to all human welfare, has most effectively contradicted its message right when and where the expression of love and brotherhood could have been made gloriously effectual.

IV. Conclusion

It is evident from the foregoing that the Christian church must readjust its program and approach to foreign groups in rural America. The following conclusions seem inevitable in view of the preceding discussion:

1. *Language*

There is a rapid change in the exclusive use of any foreign language. Churches which persist in this approach are suffering severe losses.

For the time being the bi-lingual approach appears satisfactory. But already a distinct trend away from this to a wholly English-speaking program appears certain.

This creates many questions and problems. How rapidly should such a change be made? Does this trend mean the obvious elimination of all foreign-language leaders and churches? If so, what about the educational preparation of future leaders? Have we arrived at a point in the onward path of Christian service where all foreign-speaking and English-language churches should combine and cease to think in terms of "foreign" and "native"? If so, how can we bridge this problem?

These are serious questions. No one can answer them hastily. Further study and consideration are necessary.

2. *American Churches*

The attitude of many American churches toward the immigrant is regrettable and tragic. Somehow the English-speaking churches, especially in New England and the Central and Northwestern States, must recognize their direct responsibility, definite dependency and Christian duty to all the foreign-born in their neighborhood.

It has been shown, I believe, that the immigrant farmer and his children are worthy and promising citizens. They certainly are not inferior to the natives. The church must embrace *all* nationals and *all* races—just as the love of God does. In Christ there is neither "foreigner" nor "native"—American nor European, Italian nor Swede. It is idle to preach the brotherhood of man and to talk about the fatherhood of God as long as prejudice and ill-will, fear and discrimination are rampant.

3. *Program*

An exclusively preaching program, whether in English or any foreign tongue, is entirely inadequate. The central problems in every immigrant's home are economic, social, educational and recreational. All four constitute the field of religion. The future country church must develop a program

designed to inspire and lead all people into a wholesome application of Christian principles to every field of human interest and activity. It is not the church's business to *add* economic, educational, social, health, or recreational organizations where such exist in the community. Not at all. Our business is to cooperate with existing national, State and local agencies. We must lend a hand to every movement which seeks to better rural life. Among these organizations are the Farm Bureau, Extension Service Department, County Agencies, American Country Life Association, National Child Welfare Association, the Grange, schools and seminaries that train men and women for service to foreign peoples, cooperative agencies, and other educational institutions local and national.

The call is, in other words, for a national approach. No church or organization can successfully meet the problem all alone. The undertaking is too big and too complex. We need combined study, consideration and effort. The present *laissez-faire* policy invites defeat and cannot prove a blessing to the church or the immigrant.[7]

[7] Address Dr. Frank A. Smith, 23 East Twenty-sixth Street, New York City, for detailed information concerning the Conference of Foreign-Language Churches, held under the auspices of The American Baptist Home Mission Society in Detroit, Mich., September, 1932. This paper was read before the assembled delegates.

EDITORIAL NOTES

Re-Thinking Missions

THE missionary enterprise is the most magnificent piece of philanthropy that the whole world has ever seen. It has moved thousands of men and women to adopt an alien domicile that they might share the best they have and know with others. Besides that, it has so moved the hearts of Christian people the world over that they have given and continued to give out of their substance for the support of the enterprise. Much of the giving has entailed large sacrifices and betokened intense devotion. For various reasons, not always articulate, there has been within the last decade a sharp decline in giving and in interest. It seemed to some of the laymen who were the most loyal friends of the cause that the time had come to take stock of the enterprise, seeking a thorough understanding of all of its assets and liabilities. The Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry was the outcome of that conviction. Instituted in 1930, the inquiry has proceeded through the work of two commissions, the first the fact finders, the second appraisers. The published report [1] of the commission of appraisal gives us the opportunity of studying their findings.

Re-Thinking Christianity

THE report represents not only a re-thinking of missions, but of Christianity. It is more than a survey of facts and conditions. It is an interpretation. In fact the validity or otherwise of the findings and suggestions for the conduct of missions stands or falls with the acceptance or rejection of the interpretation of Christianity. The report is in no sense a theological treatise, and yet few recent books have pro-

[1] *Re-Thinking Missions.* By the Commission of Appraisal, William Ernest Hocking, Chairman. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932. Pp. xv, 349. Price, $2.00.

founder theological significance. For any who regard Christianity as mainly a set of observances or a body of doctrines the interpretation of these commissioners will be unacceptable. But those who believe that Christianity is a way of life in which loyalty to Jesus Christ is the paramount issue, will find this a work of great penetration.

The conception of Christianity as a way of living is no new-fangled fantasy. It is really the attempt to recover a lost emphasis. Until now the majority of missionary organizations have been integral parts of denominational machinery. With the best of intentions to bear the gospel to the non-Christian world, the missionaries have been too much the proponents of their own denominations. It will not do to condemn them wholesale on that account. It is exceedingly difficult for one to attempt to transmit the kernel of Christianity without any of the shell by which one has found it encased. In fact it is psychologically impossible for any one to dissociate completely the Christian message from its social habiliments. Inevitably one absorbs certain of the appurtenances as fundamental when in truth they should be regarded as accidental.

The commissioners have made a vigorous plea that missions can unite to share with the Orient the simplicity of Christianity. Let the peoples of other cultures draw on their own cultures for imagery, symbolism and doctrinal formulations. The Indians and Chinese have every whit as much right to interpret Jesus and his message through their imagery and concepts as we have. Obviously it is impossible to transmit to the Orient a colorless, uninterpreted gospel. The need is increasingly urgent for men and women so to steep themselves in the culture of the people to whom they minister that they will find the points of contact through which to share their experiences of enrichment. It is indeed "imperative that we present our faith in terms which those wholly unfamiliar with the history of Christian doctrine can understand."

It is not so easy to differentiate between the Christian

and other religions on the basis of truth and error as is sometimes imagined. Sharing religious experiences and values implies a recognition of worthful elements in the religious experiences of non-Christians. That must be assumed; otherwise there is no basis for an appeal. It is high time that we realize the reciprocity involved in a sharing process. The people of the Orient have, as the result of their experiences in other faiths, something to share with us, something to contribute to the fuller realization of the Christian gospel. The value of meditation and the deeper significance of certain aspects of mysticism are among the experiences that the Orient may very well share with the Christian West.

Christian and non-Christian today stand face to face with the same insidious enemy of all religion, the tendency to secularism and materialism. The alternative that is most baffling today is not Christianity or Buddhism or Islam, but any religion or no religion. The growing spirit of irreligion so strongly entrenched in Russia and Turkey and so assiduously active everywhere is the danger which all religions face in common. The spread of a secular, critical culture is even harder on the other religions than on our own. People are not much concerned with any authoritative revelation today, but many are in revolt against all alike. "The case that must now be stated is the case for any religion at all." We must recognize what is good and strengthen it, wherever it is to be found.

Re-Vamping Missions

HAVE the Laymen's Commissioners lit a torch that will result in a conflagration? Are we to have a revolution in missions? They themselves would prefer an evolution to a revolution, one of its dominant aspects to be devolution. They have no desire to disrupt the enterprise, but they have made definite and somewhat drastic proposals for its reorganization, recognizing that the changes ought to take a period of years to be effected. The aim of the missionary is to render himself

dispensable. His job is to work himself out of a job. That will come to pass only when the Christian religion with its message and institutions takes its place as indigenous to the soil. Its apparent foreignness is one of its most formidable obstacles. To effect such a transformation it is necessary to enlist the best minds of the Orient in the interpretation of Christianity to their own people. Christianity has suffered more in the Orient from poor pedagogy than anything else. It has failed to proceed from the known to the unknown because its representatives were often unaware of the common denominators of which they could be advantaged. We need men and women imbued with the spirit of the Master who can translate that spirit into the language and life that the people understand.

The entire program of missions needs to be reconsidered from this angle of vision. One of the weak spots at present is theological education which is too often both intellectually inferior and practically irrelevant to the needs of the people. No small part of the trouble harks back to our denominational differences that have prevented us from cooperating in theological education on the mission field. The deplorable result is the training of pastors among the nationals of the East who, with a few notable exceptions, are unable to assume leadership and command a hearing from non-Christian intellectuals. There is urgent need for fewer and better seminaries which will do more to train men whose lives will so expand into the cultural life about them that a new amalgam, at once national and Christian, will be formed.

The greatest instrument for building the city of God in the Orient is Christian personality. We have had preaching aplenty; too much of a certain type. We have suffered from the näiveté of an unenlightened evangelism that assumed that Christian obligation ended with the proclamation of the message, responsibility thenceforth resting with the hearer. Our schools and colleges, industrial experiments and hospitals

have suffered at the hands of those who regarded them as secondary means to the evangelistic end. A poor school or second-rate hospital is no recommendation for a glorious gospel. The imperative need is for men and women who will live the Christian way in school and hospital, on the farm and in the town, doing their tasks the very best possible way from the Christian motive. The evangelism of a life of loyal service for the people in the name of the Master is far and away the most effective presentation of the Christian faith. Let people live their faith, and their lives will preach the most eloquent sermons.

It is not surprising that the Commissioners should remind us that quality is vastly more important than quantity. It is better far to have here and there a man or woman of upstanding personality and devotion than a much larger number of mediocre persons who are only capable of perpetuating the routine. If the Christian faith is to be so built into the lives of Japanese, Chinese and Indians that in case of disintegration of the church of today, they would rebuild it tomorrow, it will mean that we must work more intensively, even if we work less extensively. The number of merely nominal adherents of Christianity in the Orient is a disgrace to the Christian name. The times summon us to recover from our feverish anxiety for statistical reports of progress, and to be content to let the spirit of Jesus go marching on in whatever ways it will. After all the most profound achievements of the missionary enterprises, as indeed of religion in any aspect, quite escape the tables of the statistician.

The divisiveness of our Christianity is another of the obstacles that cry aloud for removal. Is not loyalty to our common Master a sufficient basis for cooperation? Here and there on the mission field we see splendid cooperative experiments. We ought to be able to respond to the challenge of the laymen to work together. The multiplicity of boards, secretaries and offices eats far too deeply into the already limited

resources. Overlapping on the field is nothing short of sinful waste. But more tragic than these formal matters is the divided front that we present to the non-Christian world. The obstacles from without are too serious to be augmented continually by our secretarianism. Whatever our denominational loyalties may mean to us, they bear no vital significance to the lives of Chinese and Indians. The present need is for unity on a comprehensive scale that will put an end to this shame.

Surely our own loyalty to Jesus Christ ought to inspire us to encourage his disciples in the younger churches of the mission field to develop their religious life and articulate it in harmony with their own conceptions and genius. The administration of missions is an instrument of the kingdom of love that Jesus always inaugurates. If the instrument needs making over for the better attainment of its high purpose, then let us do it. What matter if a particular plan or organization die, if only that kingdom flourish? Even the church is not an end in itself. Perhaps the ultimate significance of the laymen's report to the organization of missions may be epitomized in the words of Jesus: "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."

BOOK REVIEWS

A Study of Jesus' Own Religion. GEORGE WALTER FISKE. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1932. Pp. xvi, 360. $2.00.

THIS is a suggestive book. All of Professor Fiske's books have been such. Professor Fiske has won an enviable place in modern religious literature. His *Recovery of Worship* is recalled as the choice of the Religious Book Club for May, 1931. The present volume is the designed sequel to that one. For twenty-five years as Professor of Religious Education and Practical Theology at Oberlin College, in the Graduate School of Theology, he has been preparing himself for this refreshing study of Jesus' own religion and the application of Jesus' theory and practise of living to present-day problems. By experience in the academic lecture room, in summer schools of the Young Men's Christian Association, in university and college summer schools, in denominational training centers for teachers, he has learned the art of presenting results of thorough research and exact scholarship in language that charms by its simplicity and clearness and force. Every chapter has its surprises.

The volume is what it purports to be, "A Study of Jesus' Own Religion." The author takes the incarnation seriously. He assumes that Jesus' religion was a constantly enriching experience from childhood to the end of life. By sympathetic knowledge of the kind of religion Jesus knew in his childhood home, in his Nazareth village, and in the wider area of Palestine, the author reproduces the inner life of Jesus as child, as adolescent, as carpenter, as teacher, as Saviour. This study forms Part I of the volume. It is not a wholly new approach, but its treatment is so fresh and intimate as to make earlier more elaborate approaches seem stale and stilted.

Having made Jesus' own religion seem real, Parts II and III deal with the practical values of Jesus' life for today. For Doctor Fiske is not simply a theoretical professor of religious education. His is not simply an historian's interest in the kind of life Jesus lived. He wishes to answer the question whether Jesus' religion can be lived in a carpenter's shop today as in Nazareth nineteen hundred years ago. He is not content with the "interim ethics" of Sweitzer. Too many serious-minded folk are asking, "What have we to do with thee?" And Professor Fiske answers in Part II by presenting Jesus' "Revolutionary Ideals" in twelve chapters: How much is a human life worth? Revolutionary Standards of happi-

ness; The spiritual might of the childlike; The subtle potency of kindness; The religion of the Golden Rule; A new ideal of righteousness; The transfiguring power of prayer; The moral conquests of forgiveness; Revolutionary ideals of manual labor; A new concept of unselfish service; New insights into neighborliness; A new standard of greatness.

In Part III the author transfers these ideals to contemporary life under the general theme "Creative Convictions." How thoroughgoing and comprehensive his illustrations of the timeless character of Jesus' own conviction may be gathered from chapters XXIII to XXXI: The Golden Rule in family life; The Golden Rule and property rights; The Golden Rule in industry; The Golden Rule and the use of wealth; The Golden Rule and the nation; The religion of friendship and justice; The religion of the cross; Jesus' religion and American Christianity; Creative Christian experience.

A selected bibliography, classified index and index to Scriptural passages add to the value of the book.

If any one is in doubt whether Jesus has a message for today he should pay heed to Professor Fiske's interpretation. If any one is sure of the permanent values of the Gospels, but has not been able to formulate them satisfactorily, *A Study of Jesus' Own Religion* will be helpful.

MILTON G. EVANS.

Religion in Our Times. GAIUS GLENN ATKINS. New York: Round Table Press, Inc. 1932. Pp. 330. $2.75.

THE last few years have already introduced us most favorably to Doctor Atkins, in his *Procession of the Gods, The Making of the Christian Mind,* and other writings. Few are better qualified to do what is undertaken in this volume, namely, to write the epic of the last half-century of religion in America. As an interpreter he excels. He gives us here not a procession of men and cults, sects and movements, but an appraisal thereof.

Religion in Our Times begins with Moody and draws up with the Humanist who "makes a brave bid for the high conduct of an enterprise which, he believes, a man may carry off nobly, though he himself is 'for the dark' and his inconsequential planet is a bubble in the current of a vast, purposeless energy."

The author's bringing into his epic, by name, the men and women who have played parts of prominence in this religious drama makes his book a fascinating human document. Moreover he writes with such evident good humor and in such charming style as to make the reader

feel he has in his hand a volume of historical fiction. One lays it aside with difficulty, once having opened its pages; particularly so if that one has lived through and participated in the religious work of the forty years herein covered, 1892-1932.

To review such a volume adequately requires more space than is here available. Let us rather merely call the roll of its chapters, and let them whet the appetite of the prospective reader: "The Twilight of Revivalism," "New Forces and Old Faith," "The Church Discovers the Social Gospel," "The Rise of the Institutional Church," "Liberalism Wrestles with Its Creeds," "Religion Reckons with Science," "We Are Not Divided, 'All One Army We'—The Crusading Church," "The Churches and World Peace," "The Irrepressible Conflict," "Religion and Printer's Ink," "The Real Experimentalists," "Concerning a Variety of Things," and "Conclusion."

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

Have We Outgrown Religion? CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN, D. D. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1932. Pp. viii, 198. $2.00.

CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN, Dean-Emeritus of the Yale Divinity School, needs no introduction to readers of wholesome books. Any book bearing his name as author will be eagerly read. His answer to the question asked by many, "Have We Outgrown Religion?" is given with a full understanding of the world in which we live. He knows the perplexities of the serious, the foibles of the dilettante, the make-believe of the cynic, the varying moods of those who live under pressure. In printed form this book retains the flavor of the spoken words in Battell chapel, where much of it was first used. It has the author's well-known aptness of illustration, humor, and wisdom. To be sure he answers his own question with a triumphant, "No." Anyone who is equally sure of the answer may well read this book, not for confirmation of his faith, but for suggestions as to method in making less certain more certain. It is a good illustration of effective apologetic preaching. The table of contents will entice: (1) Has the Modern World Outgrown Religion? (2) How Can We Make Religion Real? (3) Getting Started. (4) Having Something vs. Being Something. (5) How Much Do We Want? (6) How Can We Know Life? (7) The Weakness of Half-Truths. (8) The Menace of the Crowd. (9) Right Standards. (10) Living Under Pressure. (11) Is a Future Life Inevitable?

M. G. EVANS.

A Preface to Christian Faith in a New Age. RUFUS M. JONES. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1932. Pp. 206. $2.00.

DOCTOR JONES, professor of philosophy in Haverford College, and author of a number of stimulating and inspiring books, needs no introduction to THE QUARTERLY readers. This "Preface" is arresting; it makes a beginning at re-thinking Christianity, and may well be considered a preface to "Re-Thinking Missions," which is just now challenging the thoughtful in our American churches. If we are to re-think missions, it would be well to do a bit of thinking to see what we have to offer the non-Christian world.

It is manifestly true that in all too many quarters Christianity is "running in low gear." But why? Perhaps it may be because it is not in gear at all with this present world and is being carried forward at a dying pace by the momentum of yesterday when it did gear in, climbing hills and making way through the traffic. There have been periods when Christianity was a faith that overcame the world; today it looks like a faith that is being overcome by the world. What is the difficulty? Can it be geared in again, and moved up to second and high? If so, *how* can it be done? This present status of Christianity it is that compels a frank and fearless re-thinking.

Six chapters constitute this beginning or preface to the re-thinking task: "Obstacles and Hindrances to Christian Faith in a New Age," "A Re-Examination of the Spiritual Foundations," "The Testimony of Human Experience," "The Heart of Christianity," "The Nature and Mission of the Church," and "The New Emphasis in Education."

Chapter I confronts the present thought-world which has been given us by science and the scientific method, and through that world blazes a clear trail. Such a task frankly confronts bothersome overgrowth, both religious and scientific, which must be cleared away. Chapter II walks the highways of the world with the masters in the realms of both religion and science. From these come the cheering assurance that there is no necessary conflict between the two, rather in fact they converge toward a unity which promises much for the tomorrows. Naturalism and Secularism have lost their standing among the masters as among the many who discover that men are smothered beneath their too low ceilings. Chapter III holds that human experience must be taken as a valid field for scientific research, and that when this is done such experience will validate the great tenets of the Christian faith. Chapter IV finds the heart of Christianity to be the triumph of Grace over Law, the Father over the Absolute. This was the supreme spiritual insight of Christ. Chapter V turns to practical

matters. The first essential task of the church is to make men aware of God and his power actually in their lives. Youth must be given larger place since hope of change lies mostly in them. There must come a more expansive unity among the branches of the Church Universal, each making some vital and enriching contribution toward raising the spiritual level and value of life. Chapter VI takes note of the newer educational emphasis in the churches and indicates that in that direction lies our greatest hope.

This "Preface" is sane, wholesome, arresting; we commend it for what it professes to be, namely, a beginning, at re-thinking Christianity.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

The Christian Ideal and Social Control. FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1932. Pp. 175. $1.75.

THIS comparatively small volume is important far beyond what its modest size might seem to indicate. It consists of the Barrows Lectures for 1930-1931, which were given by Bishop McConnell at different centers in India to large and responsive audiences. The Barrows Lectureship was established in 1894, and the first course of these Lectures was delivered during the winter of 1896-1897. A real contribution to such a series after thirty-five years is obviously not an easy task, but Bishop McConnell has succeeded fully, as an examination of this volume shows. He treats first the basic subject of human values, on which he builds a careful structure in which is sketched the religious problems of the actual present world, the extent of the task before the religious thinker of today, the necessity of institutional, as well as individual, conversion, the need of sacrifice on the part of society as well as on the part of the individual, and a view of humanism which emphasizes the diviner things in the life of mankind. Though the volume deals naturally and inevitably with the difficult problems in any careful treatment of the religious thinking of the world, yet the language, as might be expected from Bishop McConnell, is sufficiently popular to be read with satisfaction. Also, there is a convenient index for reference as occasion offers.

FRANK GRANT LEWIS.

Prayer (Das Gebet). FRIEDRICH HEILER. Translated by SAMUEL MCCOMB, D. D. New York: Oxford University Press. 1932. Pp. i, 376. $3.50.

MUCH has been written about prayer, but the English world has lacked even an attempted adequate treatment of prayer from the historico-psychological point of view until the recent publication of this transla-

tion of Friedrich Heiler's *Das Gebet,* by Samuel McComb. In the few psychologies of prayer that we have or even in some of the more recent devotional literature about prayer one has heard the far-off echo of this masterful work which was published in German near the end of the World War. Now, thanks to Doctor McComb, the echo has become real to the great body of the English-speaking world who have been handicapped in reading the original because of language difficulties.

As one reads the book he is first impressed with the great historical breadth and scope of the work. Heiler has ransacked human history for the abundant illustrative material he utilizes. In the second place the reviewer feels that for the first time we have given us by Heiler a method of organization that is adequate to the thorough treatment of the subject of prayer. One finds in Heiler's plan of organization a sincere attempt to approach prayer as a growing, living phenomenon with a history that goes back to the most primitive times. His approach is thus more in keeping with the scientific temper of the times than any other similar work yet published in English.

The note which he strikes in his fifth and sixth chapters is particularly fine. One feels the depth of his experience of prayer. In his fifth chapter, " Prayer in the Experience of Great Religious Personalities," he most significantly points out that " in the personal religion of great saints prayer is not limited to certain occasions; it accompanies all thought and action; it becomes a *life of prayer,* a continuous hourly and daily intercourse with God." This is the goal toward which the praying man is constantly striving.

In his sixth chapter, " General Characteristics of Mysticism and Prophetic Religion," and in the sequel chapters, " Prayer in Mysticism," and " Prayer in Prophetic Religion," Heiler has given us a most searching analysis and yet a most clear portrait of the mind of the mystic and the mind of the prophet.

The weakness of the book is most clearly seen in the fourth chapter, " Critique and Ideal of Prayer in Philosophic Thought," though it really underlies the whole point of view of the book. We discover this inconsistency. On the one hand Heiler freely admits that idealistic philosophy sets up " a positive ideal of prayer " which is also highly ethical, and he even goes on to the extent of pointing out in his chapter entitled " Prayer in the Experience of Great Religious Personalities " that this note of positive idealism is one of the great points of distinction that must be drawn between what he conceives to be the highest expression of prayer and primitive prayer. On the other hand he argues inconsistently with

himself that "Rational philosophical thought means the disintegration and dissolution of prayer." Of course we must agree with the author to this extent that many systems of philosophic thought have put stumbling-blocks in the way of the life of prayer, but we cannot therefore conclude with him that rational thinking is opposed to the experience of prayer, or in other words that prayer is and must be an entirely non-rational experience.

WARREN VINTON MURPHY.

Psychology for Religious Workers. LINDSAY DEWAR, Canon of York, and CYRIL E. HUDSON, Chaplain to the Bishop of St. Albans. New York: Ray Long and Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1932. Pp. x, 238. $2.00.

THE pastoral office is "an expert's task, demanding knowledge, not only of psychology, but of the church's tradition of moral and ascetical theology." This is precisely the impression the reader draws after examining this book. The authors have attempted to redefine the cure of souls in terms of a deepened respect for personality. Their preparation for their work was threefold: they are thoroughly acquainted with the traditions of the church; they have familiarized themselves with a type of psychology; and professionally, they are pastors. The reader will not fail to be convinced that these clerics reveal new possibilities in personnel leadership, and that he stands somewhat indicted by reason of his own incompetency in the office. After examining certain devotional prerequisites to the shepherding lot, the authors consider "the pastor," "the flock," and finally "pastoral methods."

The attempt to relate psychology and theology brings out elements of strength and shortcoming in the text. Theology predominates both in premises of religion and in vocabulary. More stress rests upon certain great values of the church than upon objective and realistic treatment of the same. Psychology is "applied" only. Critical science and uncriticized Christian traditions can scarcely be expected to harmonize fitly. Besides, the authors' psychological outlook is limited to that of MacDougall and the psychoanalysts. For this reason, the approach to the individual is individualistic rather than social. Much emphasis is placed upon the significance of the instinctive constitution of man and too little upon his group-culture. The authors concern themselves with the more advanced stages of "sin" in personality, neglecting the commonplace faults that contribute chiefly to the disturbance of parish souls.

Notwithstanding these unavoidable problems in such groundbreaking work, the authors have written a book that will prove self-revealing to every minister in the Christian church.

STEWART G. COLE.

Pastoral Psychology. KARL RUF STOLZ. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press. 1932. Pp. 260. $2.00.

THE author is Dean Stolz of the Hartford School of Religious Education, on the Hartford Seminary Foundation. He makes a survey of the results of present-day psychology, then relates these findings to the practical work of the pastoral ministry.

No one, even casually acquainted with the new psychology, may doubt that very significant progress is being made toward understanding the development of the human personality, or soul; how it grows, on what it feeds, the diseases that attack and their symptoms, effective methods of care, etc. All this must be of profound interest to the Christian minister, since he professes to be expert in matters of the soul—a profession, alas, on which he too frequently cannot realize. Only God can estimate the damage done growing personality by well-meant religious programs and emphases! All of which is increasingly without excuse, thanks to such writers as Dean Stolz and a host of wise leaders in the field of religious education.

The volume before us is composed of eighteen chapters, number VIII bearing the heading, "Religion as a Rallying Center." Here is the nub of its value to the pastoral minister: *Religion at the center.* Some psychologists seem able to leave religion out of the personality picture; here it is at the heart of the picture. Religion becomes the integrating center for the normally growing life, and the rallying center for the sick of soul who seeks health. This chapter falls into these considerations: The religious response to crises, Religion in typical adjustments, Religion and mental pathologies, How religion becomes effective.

Chapters V, XV, and XVIII have to do with specifically religious phases of life, namely, "Personality Types and Religious Experience," "Religion and the Talk Cure," and "Pastoral Counseling." Other fourteen chapters afford the background for an intelligent discussion of the involvements of religion in the process of growing and maintaining the well-integrated and vigorous personality.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

Human Nature and the Church. PERCY ELLIOTT LINDLEY. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1932. Pp. 245. $2.00.

THIS is the kind of book I wish I might have found twenty-five years ago when in the midst of my college course I began to sense the newer and larger world of religion which science was making possible. Hence this volume, it seems to the reviewer, should fall into the hands of thought-

ful young folk, and lay people whose minds are yet awake. To such it should prove a mental and religious liberator.

Its philosophy is fundamentally sound, namely, that the needs of man transcend and are antecedent to the institutions which men have built. In other words, our institutions—including the churches—are created to meet our genuinely felt needs, and they can exist only so long as they meet such needs. "The Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath." Moreover, needs change (as well as institutions) and when religious needs shift, so must the churches. To fail to do it is to court certain death. This is the tragedy today, that the *need* of all thinking men is for a vital integration of the essentials of the old faith and the assured results of the new knowledge, and yet fifty per cent. of our churches are attempting to carry on as though there were no body of new knowledge with which men must reckon.

Approaching his study from the angle above indicated, Dean Lindley considers the soul's need of a religion that fits it as a glove the hand; such a religion must cultivate and court beauty, and moreover the churches must eschew the crude and non-beautiful in all their ministry. Also the church must look to the comfort of its people, must satisfy the social hunger, must give wide opportunity for religious self-expression, must provide a ministry of which young and old can be genuinely proud, must gird its loins for success, i. e., must bring things to pass, nurture and fan into flame every rich and noble sentiment, and withal lead the men and women of this modern world into a religious certainty compatible with intellectual honesty and soul integrity.

To men like the reviewer *Human Nature and the Church* deals with "old stuff," yet there are some sixty million people in these United States to whom its message would be new and stimulating.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

The Angel in the Soul. REV. JOSEPH FORT NEWTON, D. D. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1932. Pp. 122. $1.00.

Seeing the Invisible. HAROLD COOKE PHILLIPS. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1932. Pp. 122. $1.00.

When Christ Passes By. WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1932. Pp. 134. $1.00.

HARPER BROTHERS are publishing little volumes of contemporary preachers' sermons, three of which are now published.

The first one by Joseph Fort Newton, known internationally as a preacher in the English tongue, bears the title *The Angel in the Soul.*

One looks with expectancy to a group of notable literary excellency and is not disappointed. The sermon topics are worth while and have to do with great themes in our common every-day life, brilliantly worked out and with much spiritual realism.

The volume by Harold Cooke Phillips, *Seeing the Invisible,* is worthy of the companionship in which it finds itself. Like that of Doctor Newton, it deals with great themes, the first requisite of a great preacher. It deals with them adequately and with literary grace, and it deals with them convincingly. It hardly seems quite right to single out one sermon, but yet, if one should, it seems to me "The Prince of Peace" is one of the most outstanding of the series. It is a notable presentation of the cause of peace and the place of Christ in accomplishing that great object.

When Christ Passes By, the volume by the distinguished rector of Grace Church, New York, is a fine contribution to the art of preaching religion. There is a great simplicity in his statements, but they are never commonplace. Beauty and strength go hand in hand, but above all there is a sureness of religious experience which makes the volume of unusual merit.

G. F. FINNIE.

Planning Your Preaching. WILLIAM L. STIDGER, Litt. D. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1932. Pp. 289. $2.50.

THIS quite remarkable volume by Doctor Stidger hardly fulfils the promise of the title, *Planning Your Preaching.* Instead of a book dedicated to the discussion of the methods used in planning one's sermons, it really plans them for you, for in the last analysis it is a compendium of material which Doctor Stidger has himself planned through the years, the cream of which is embodied in this book. It is really a source-book of preaching material that goes all the way from the most serious kind of discussions to the lightest and most frivolous kind of jokes.

On the cover-page, the publishers have again used the seductive suggestion that this is a "golden treasury of source material for the busy preacher." That may be so, and no doubt the "busy preacher" into whose hands this volume falls will use it much like the "undergrad" used the "ponies" for translating their Latin at college. Books of this description are mostly used by "busy preachers" who might be better designated by another title.

There is real danger in the use of such a book as this, and yet it is an amazing tribute to the industry and ingenuity of the man who wrote it. There is much in it that is good, provided it is used wisely and honestly.

G. F. FINNIE.

Literature in the Bible. GEORGE SPRAU. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1932. Pp. xiii, 441. $3.50.

TO GIVE a complete survey of the Bible and its many problems in one volume, even a large one, is quite impossible. Nor has the author attempted this. On the other hand, he has provided a valuable tool for becoming acquainted with the Bible—what it is and what sort of material the reader may expect to find. It is the type of book that might very well serve as a guide in a college course on the Bible. The author modestly denies the claim of expert critical knowledge, and does not develop at length questions of criticism or history, since he has not sought to add to technical knowledge. He has made use of modern scholarship, and has produced a volume which should interest and instruct not alone the youth but "those older people [who if they] were more studious readers of the Bible than are the young people of today, . . must have been endowed with an extraordinary power of forgetfulness."

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

Harriet Martineau: An Example of Victorian Conflict. NAROLA ELIZABETH RIVENBURG. Philadelphia: Published by the author and distributed privately. 1932. Pp. 110.

THIS study was submitted by the author "in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy, in the faculty of philosophy, Columbia University." And it may be said of it, as it cannot be said of all such dissertations, "it is a contribution to knowledge." For, as the subtitle indicates, it is not so much a study of Harriet personally as it is of the religious, economic, political and social order of old England during her lifetime. Rightly the author has realized that the subject of her sketch cannot be fairly viewed except on the background of her own world relationships.

Spanning the three-quarter century, 1802-1876, Harriet Martineau lived through some of the most glorious years of England's adventurous and revolutionary imperialism. Her childhood years witnessed the death-grapple with Napoleon; her young maidenhood the expansion of the nation's industrial order and its consequent class problems; her later years the consolidation of the empire and the gigantic tasks of administration.

All this Miss Rivenburg tells simply and clearly but most interestingly. We are introduced to her father's home as that of an early silk manufacturer who, however, failed in business while Harriet was still young. That may account in large measure for her own long and intense interest

in the social questions of her day, of which she wrote so much. The industrial and imperial expansion raised such questions as production's relation to labor and capital; the effect of manufacturing upon agriculture; housing and sanitation; taxation; international relationships; slavery. In all which concerns Harriet was brought into fellowship with such other great authors as Thomas Carlyle and John Stuart Mill.

The reading of this dissertation thus gives a splendid résumé of Victorian English history. Here may be seen the tremendous problems which had to be solved as the nation worked out its order of life. The conflict between ruthless imperialism and the sense of responsibility—the weight of the white man's burden. In the life and work of one author, just a woman, who dwelt sensitively in the midst of it, Miss Rivenburg has enabled us to read with new significance that story we may have earlier found in the lives of national heroes—the statesmen and generals of England's glorious epoch.

R. E. E. HARKNESS.

Riches for All. HARRISON E. FRYBERGER. Advance Publishing Company of New York. 1932. Pp. 138. $1.00.

Our Economic Life in the Light of Christian Ideals. Prepared by a Special Committee for the Department of Research and Education of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. New York: Association Press. 1932. Pp. xi, 161. Paper, 90 cents; cloth, $1.50.

THESE books are samples of many being written with the avowed purpose of contributing something to the solution of pressing economic problems.

The author of the one mentioned first is a lawyer, who makes bold to appear as "the attorney for the masses of the American people." In presenting his plea in their behalf he lists twelve national economic abuses and discusses available remedies for them. He insists that when these abuses are corrected, capitalism will be found to be the most satisfactory economic system, comprising "all the beneficial qualities found in Communism, Socialism and Fascism combined, and much more besides." This volume embodies the results of intelligent and painstaking study, presented in a clear and vigorous style which never allows interest to lag.

The writers responsible for the second book are experts in the fields covered. As it is designed for the use of study groups, a careful examination is made of the present economic system, the bearing upon it of Christian ideals, and the possibility of building an economic plan which would conform to those ideals. A discussion syllabus covering each chapter, and several pages of bibliography, add much to the value of the book for the purpose in view. There is also an appendix giving a summary of the

"Clark-Smith-Soule Plan," which is a notable effort to suggest means for securing needed improvement in the present economic order. The work is worthy of careful reading, and of wide use in study classes, discussion groups, and educational conferences.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER.

Ethics. DEWEY AND TUFTS. Revised Edition. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1932. Pp. xiii, 528. $3.00; students ed., $2.50.

THERE is probably no book on ethics that has met the need of a college text in the last two decades so well as Dewey and Tufts. And now, after twenty-four years, we have a revised edition that will do much to maintain the book's high standard of usefulness. The authors wonder whether it is quite fair to call it a revised edition, since about two-thirds of the book has been rewritten. They have retained the basic plan, though it has been worked out differently.

The new edition takes account of the extensive inquiries into the problems of human conduct that have appeared in recent years. It also reflects the determination of the authors to face squarely the moral issues of modern civilization. Part I, as before, furnishes a historical account of the development of morality from primitive life to the present day. The new chapter on the Roman contribution supplies a need that the older edition left unsatisfied. The revision of the treatment of Factors and Trends in the Modern Moral Consciousness is excellently done. Part II, which deals with the philosophical aspects of ethics, has been completely revamped. The student will find it somewhat more concise, but written with great care. In the third part, a number of practical problems are discussed, and here we have the evidence that our authors have utilized the findings of sociologists and economists to make their treatment more adequate.

Both of these authors are men of wide erudition and experience. Though they have retired from active professional work, they continue by their pens to make the labors of other teachers more useful. By the revised edition of their *Ethics,* they have earned our lasting gratitude.

A. S. WOODBURNE.

BOOK NOTICES

Religious Education in the Small Church. LEWIS JOSEPH SHERRILL. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1931. Pp. 208. 75 cents.

THE author writes under the conviction that competent leadership can accomplish more for the cause of Christian education in the small church than in the large one. He does make out a good case for the church in town or country containing one hundred and fifty or fewer members. In order to avoid an academic approach, Dr. Sherrill corresponded with successful ministers in small churches and learned what features they stressed. Experience was gathered from many corners of the country. Some surprisingly fertile policies were brought to light and have been made available in this manual. It is the reviewer's judgment that every rural minister should become acquainted with the practical material which Doctor Sherrill has provided. Not every experiment enunciated will be useful in every parish, but no aggressive leader will fail to find adequate suggestions to lead him out into more fruitful service. Particularly will this be true in reference to children's and youth work. The dignified standards of religious education advanced by the International Council of Religious Education are honored throughout the book.

As one scans the pattern of religion which underlies the materials, he wishes that the author had conceived the function of religion in broader and more concrete terms. It is doubtful if "evangelism" and "education" as defined are sufficiently critical analyses to support the diversity of life-interests today.

The author is professor of religious education in Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary, its dean, and the editor of "Handybooks for Church School Leaders."

The Prophets and the Problems of Life. SIDNEY A. WESTON. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1932. Pp. 207. Paper, 35 cents; cloth, 65 cents.

USUALLY a small volume in paper cover may be dismissed rather lightly with comparative assurance that no serious loss has occurred. The librarian particularly is likely to be impressed in that way. The book now in hand, received in its paper-bound edition, tended thus to discount itself, but examination of the pages gave an entirely different reaction, and I should like to commend the volume strongly to students of the Old Testament prophets and their significance for review of the problems of

present-day living. Doctor Weston, out of his varied and rich experience as a student, editor, and a teacher of thoughtful young people, has provided an exceptionally stimulating book, which at once shows understanding of the teachings of the Israelitish prophets and deals very suggestively with the personal and social questions of our time. The book may well become a reference work, and purchase of the cloth edition is worth while.

The Lord's Prayer. GEORGE HERBERT PALMER. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1932. Pp. 24. 50 cents.

ATTEMPTING to write even a small volume on the Lord's Prayer is perhaps not unlike attempting to decorate a beautiful rose, but Professor Emeritus Palmer of Harvard University has undertaken the highly difficult task and has achieved success, at least to the extent of providing, with the happy cooperation of the Pilgrim Press, a booklet which will be useful for the many who may naturally desire a suitable development of the thought which is so concisely expressed in the Model Prayer. The book is heartily commended for companionship with the Lord's Prayer itself and Christian devotional use.

Revolutionary Atheistic Socialism Versus Religion. ALFRED WESLEY WISHART, D. D., Minister Fountain Street Baptist Church, Grand Rapids, Michigan. Published by the Extension Club of the Church. Pp. 46. 25 cents.

THIS pamphlet consists of four sermons preached by Doctor Wishart, in which he deals fearlessly with the atheistic communism of Soviet Russia, and examines its proposal to banish God. He meets atheism with the conception of God that Professor Wieman has been developing, and endeavors to show that the world, including Russia, needs such a God for its moral and social redemption. The messages are virile, opportune, convincing—what one might expect from one of America's most thoughtful preachers.

The Rebel Prophet: Studies in the Personality of Jeremiah. T. CROUTHER GORDON. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1932. Pp. 260. $2.00.

THIS has been a loudly lauded volume. Its title is arresting and such chapter headings as, the prophet as statesman, rebel, optimist, poet and mystic, promise much to the reader. The author, a Scotch pastor, has a good background in Semitic languages, has had some archæological experience in Palestine, and has a great love for Jeremiah. He has done honor to his hero. There are many valuable interpretations and much fine appreciation, but the classic has still to be written on this the greatest of the prophets.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Important Books will be reviewed in a forthcoming issue

Re-Thinking Missions. Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1932. Pp. xv, 349. $2.00. See Editorial Notes.

Screen and Projector in Christian Education. H. Paul Jones. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1932. Pp. 160. $1.00.

The Ground of Faith and the Chaos of Thought. Olive Chase Quick. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1932. Pp. 152. $1.50.

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